## Facts

- Michigan enacted 1992 Public Act 270 (MCL 752.1027), making it a felony to “assist in a suicide.”
- Jack Kevorkian, M.D., faced multiple prosecutions arising from his involvement in deaths where terminally ill persons ended their lives with his assistance.
- Several Michigan trial courts dismissed charges or invalidated the statute on varying constitutional grounds, including due process theories and a state Title–Object Clause challenge.
- In related “open murder” proceedings, a trial court concluded that assisting a suicide was not murder.
- The Michigan Court of Appeals (in consolidated matters) held the assisted-suicide statute unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution but also held there was no constitutional right to commit suicide; it also reinstated murder charges on a theory that assistance could constitute common-law murder.
- The Michigan Supreme Court granted review in consolidated appeals to resolve the statute’s validity and the relationship between assisted suicide and common-law murder.

## Issues

1. Whether the Michigan assisted-suicide statute violates the Michigan Constitution’s Title–Object Clause.
2. Whether the federal or Michigan constitutions recognize a fundamental right to commit suicide or to receive assistance in committing suicide, barring criminal penalties.
3. Whether a person who intentionally provides the means for another to commit suicide may be prosecuted for common-law murder when the decedent performs the final act causing death.

## Decision

- The court held that neither the United States Constitution nor the Michigan Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to commit suicide or to obtain assistance in committing suicide.
- The court upheld Michigan’s assisted-suicide statute against the Title–Object Clause challenge, finding it embraced a single general object relating to death and dying, including assisted suicide.
- The court held that merely providing the means by which another commits suicide does not constitute murder under Michigan common law, overruling prior authority to the extent it suggested otherwise.
- The court distinguished “active participation” in the final act causing death (which may support homicide liability) from furnishing means that the decedent independently uses (which does not).
- The court remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings, permitting prosecution under the assisted-suicide statute while foreclosing murder liability based solely on furnishing means in the pre-statute cases.

## Legal Principles

- Substantive due process does not require a state to permit assisted suicide; a state may criminalize assisting another’s suicide.
- The Michigan Constitution does not confer a fundamental right to suicide or assisted suicide.
- A statute satisfies Michigan’s Title–Object Clause if it has one general object expressed in its title; multiple provisions may be valid if they relate to that single object.
- For common-law murder, liability requires the defendant’s act to be the direct cause of death; if the decedent retains control of the final act, furnishing means is not murder.
- “Active participation” in the final overt act that causes death (e.g., administering a lethal injection) may support homicide charges, while mere provision of means supports, if anything, assisted-suicide liability.

## Conclusion

The decision sustained Michigan’s felony prohibition on assisted suicide, rejected claimed constitutional protections for assisted suicide, and drew a causation-based line between non-homicide assistance (furnishing means) and homicide liability for direct, active participation in causing death.


People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714 (1994)