## Facts

- Petros Demetrios Latsis was charged by information with six felony counts.
- After a preliminary hearing, the first four counts were dismissed.
- The remaining two counts alleged two separate offenses of criminal solicitation of aggravated robbery under Colorado’s criminal-solicitation statute, § 18-2-301(1), C.R.S. 1973.
- The statute criminalized commanding, inducing, entreating, or otherwise attempting to persuade another to commit a felony, with intent to promote or facilitate the felony, “and under circumstances strongly corroborative of that intent,” while exempting “bona fide acts” of authorized law-enforcement investigators.
- Latsis moved to dismiss the solicitation counts, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and unlawfully delegated legislative power.
- The district court agreed, finding the “bona fide” exemption and the “strongly corroborative” phrase unconstitutionally vague, and dismissed the solicitation counts.
- The prosecution appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether § 18-2-301(1) is unconstitutionally vague because it uses “bona fide” and requires “circumstances strongly corroborative” of intent.
2. Whether the “strongly corroborative” requirement unlawfully delegates to judges and juries the power to define criminal conduct.
3. Whether the statute is overbroad because it impermissibly reaches constitutionally protected speech.

## Decision

- The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and upheld § 18-2-301(1) as constitutional.
- The court held that “bona fide” in the law-enforcement exemption is commonly understood and provides adequate notice.
- The court held that requiring “circumstances strongly corroborative” of intent is not impermissibly vague; it operates as a limiting requirement ensuring intent is supported by surrounding facts, not merely words in isolation.
- The court rejected the delegation argument, reasoning that applying statutory standards to facts is a normal judicial function, not a legislative delegation.
- The court rejected the overbreadth claim because the statute targets solicitation to commit felonies, includes a specific intent requirement, and does not purport to prohibit solicitation of lawful acts or protected expression.

## Legal Principles

- A criminal statute is not void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence can understand what it prohibits without guessing, even if the statute is not mathematically precise.
- “Bona fide” is sufficiently definite in ordinary usage to describe legitimate, good-faith law-enforcement investigative conduct for purposes of a statutory exemption.
- A requirement that intent be shown “under circumstances strongly corroborative” of that intent may constitutionally narrow liability by demanding contextual confirmation of culpable purpose.
- The necessity for judges and juries to apply statutory terms to case-specific facts does not, by itself, constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
- A solicitation statute limited to inducing another to commit a felony, coupled with a specific intent element and corroborative-circumstances requirement, does not facially violate the First Amendment on overbreadth grounds.

## Conclusion

The court reinstated the solicitation charges, holding that Colorado’s criminal-solicitation statute provides adequate notice, sets enforceable standards, does not unlawfully delegate legislative authority, and is confined to unprotected criminal solicitation rather than protected speech.


People v. Latsis, 578 P.2d 1055 (Colo. 1978)