## Facts

- Chicago police stopped and searched a car driven by David Barksdale, a gang leader, with four passengers; no weapons were found, and the youths were released.
- Police followed Barksdale’s car to Ellis Avenue near 6526 S. Ellis, where the car slowed, stopped, and revved its engine.
- Andrew McChristian and Melvin Bailey, members of a rival gang, were present together near that location and could recognize Barksdale and his car.
- As Barksdale’s car entered the area, a group of youths lined both sides of the street; someone shouted “D’s,” and gunfire erupted from both sides toward the car.
- Officers identified Bailey as firing multiple shots and discarding a .45-caliber handgun during pursuit; officers identified McChristian as firing once and being arrested while trying to clear a jammed .25-caliber pistol.
- No one was injured and no property damage was reported.
- After arrest, Barksdale approached the police vehicle; officers testified Bailey said, “We didn’t get you this time,” and McChristian laughed and said, “We will get him next time.”
- McChristian was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit murder (charged as to Barksdale and the four passengers) and sentenced to 7 to 14 years.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that McChristian entered into an agreement, with the required specific intent, to murder the five named occupants of Barksdale’s car.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed McChristian’s conspiracy conviction and vacated the sentence.
- The court held the evidence was insufficient to prove a conspiratorial agreement to murder the specifically named individuals.
- The court concluded the record supported, at most, a spontaneous or reckless group shooting associated with gang rivalry, not a planned agreement to commit murder.
- The post-arrest statements showed hostility and possible future intent but did not establish a prior agreement to kill the named victims.

## Legal Principles

- Conspiracy requires proof of an agreement between two or more persons and the specific intent to commit the object offense.
- When an indictment alleges a conspiracy to kill specific, named victims, the State must prove intent and knowledge directed to those identified persons.
- Circumstantial evidence must establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence; presence, association, and participation in related violence do not alone prove a prior agreement.
- Post-event statements may evidence animus but do not, without more, prove a preexisting conspiratorial agreement as charged.

## Conclusion

The court reversed the conspiracy-to-murder conviction because the evidence did not show that McChristian had agreed in advance, with specific intent, to kill the five named occupants of the car; it showed only coordinated gunfire in the moment and later hostile remarks.


People v. McChristian, 309 N.E.2d 388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)