## Facts

- Arsner Burnett McCoy drove a vehicle about 55 mph in a 35 mph zone in heavy traffic and faster than surrounding cars.
- Pedestrians, including the victim (Ybarra), were stationary near the roadway and visible.
- McCoy did not slow, swerve, or otherwise react to avoid the pedestrians.
- The vehicle struck Ybarra, causing death.
- McCoy left the accident scene without stopping and remaining to provide information or render aid.
- A jury convicted McCoy of involuntary manslaughter, felonious driving, and leaving the scene of an accident; he received concurrent sentences as a third-offense habitual offender.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find gross negligence supporting involuntary manslaughter and felonious driving.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove McCoy knew or had reason to know an injury/death accident occurred, as required for leaving the scene, and whether the jury was properly instructed on that offense.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the habitual-offender sentences as disproportionate or otherwise unlawful.

## Decision

- The court affirmed all convictions and sentences.
- It held the evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, permitted a rational jury to find gross negligence based on speed, traffic conditions, visible pedestrians, and McCoy’s failure to respond.
- It held the jury could infer McCoy knew or had reason to know of the injury/death accident from the nature of the collision and his immediate departure; the instructions correctly stated the elements and burden.
- It held the sentences, imposed under the habitual-offender statute and within statutory limits, were proportionate and not an abuse of discretion.

## Legal Principles

- On sufficiency review, appellate courts view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and ask whether a rational factfinder could find each element proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Involuntary manslaughter is established by an unlawful act committed with intent to injure or in a grossly negligent manner that proximately causes death.
- Gross negligence is more culpable than ordinary negligence and involves a wanton or reckless disregard of the consequences; it may be inferred from the totality of driving circumstances.
- Felonious driving requires proof of gross negligence.
- For leaving the scene of an accident causing injury or death, the prosecution must prove the driver knew or had reason to know of the accident and then failed to stop and remain; knowledge may be shown by circumstantial evidence.
- A sentence imposed under habitual-offender provisions is generally upheld when within statutory bounds and proportionate to the offense and the offender.

## Conclusion

The court upheld convictions arising from a fatal traffic collision, concluding that speeding in heavy traffic coupled with failure to react to visible pedestrians supported a gross-negligence finding, that knowledge for leaving the scene could be inferred from the collision and flight, and that the habitual-offender sentences were lawful and proportionate.


People v. McCoy, 566 N.W.2d 667 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)