## Facts

- Jose Esparza was shot and killed in downtown Long Beach, California, on August 20, 1979, shortly after cashing his paycheck.
- The perpetrator’s identity was the primary disputed issue at trial; the prosecution’s case relied heavily on eyewitness identifications.
- Seven prosecution eyewitnesses identified Eddie Bobby McDonald as the shooter with varying certainty; one prosecution eyewitness testified that McDonald was not the gunman.
- The defense presented an alibi through six witnesses who testified McDonald was in Alabama on the day of the killing.
- The defense offered expert testimony from a qualified psychologist to explain psychological factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identification and to correct common misconceptions about perception and memory.
- The trial court excluded the expert testimony on the grounds that it would invade the jury’s role and was insufficiently scientific.
- The jury convicted McDonald of murder, found true a robbery-murder special circumstance, acquitted him of the separate substantive robbery count, and returned a death verdict.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding qualified expert testimony on psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification when identity was the central issue and the eyewitness evidence was substantially conflicting.
2. Whether, under Penal Code § 1157, the jury’s failure to specify the degree of murder in the verdict required the conviction to be deemed second-degree murder.

## Decision

- The court reversed the judgment and death sentence and remanded for further proceedings.
- The trial court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered expert testimony on eyewitness identification, and the error was prejudicial.
- Because the verdict did not specify the degree of murder, Penal Code § 1157 required the conviction to be treated as second-degree murder by operation of law.

## Legal Principles

- Qualified expert testimony on psychological factors affecting eyewitness identification is admissible on a proper showing and may be required when it would materially assist the jury on matters beyond common experience.
- Excluding eyewitness-identification expert testimony can constitute reversible abuse of discretion when identification is a key issue and the identification evidence is substantially conflicting or otherwise weak.
- Expert testimony may explain general principles affecting perception and memory without improperly opining on the credibility or accuracy of a specific witness.
- Under Penal Code § 1157, when a jury convicts of a crime divided into degrees but does not specify the degree in its verdict, the conviction must be deemed the lesser degree, even if the jury was instructed only on the greater degree.

## Conclusion

The court ordered reversal because the trial court improperly barred qualified expert testimony that could have assisted the jury in evaluating contested and conflicting eyewitness identifications, and it applied Penal Code § 1157 to treat an unspecified murder-degree verdict as second-degree murder.


People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984)