Facts
- Charles Miller, somewhat intoxicated, threatened at a post office to kill Albert Jeans, claiming Jeans had been bothering Miller’s wife and authorities would not act.
- Later that day, Jeans worked in a hop field where Constable Ginochio was also present.
- Miller entered the hop field carrying a .22-caliber rifle and walked about 100 yards toward Ginochio and Jeans, who were separated by distance.
- Miller stopped and appeared to load the rifle but did not raise it or take aim; Jeans ran away.
- Ginochio approached and took the rifle from Miller without resistance; no shot was fired.
Issues
- Whether an information charging “attempt to commit murder” is sufficient when it follows statutory language but does not plead specific overt acts, and whether any defect is waived by failure to demur.
- Whether Miller’s conduct constituted an attempt to commit murder by a direct, unequivocal act beyond preparation.
- Whether jury instructions improperly allowed the jury to presume the specific intent to kill from the deliberate commission of an unlawful act.
Decision
- The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and the order denying a new trial.
- The amended information was sufficient under Penal Code § 952, and any technical objection was waived by the failure to demur.
- The evidence was insufficient to prove attempted murder because Miller’s conduct did not amount to a direct, unequivocal act toward killing Jeans.
- The trial court gave prejudicially erroneous instructions by permitting a presumption of malicious or guilty intent from an unlawful act in a crime requiring proof of specific intent to kill.
Legal Principles
- A criminal attempt requires a direct step toward completion of the offense that goes beyond preparation and clearly manifests the criminal purpose.
- Equivocal conduct that is reasonably consistent with a noncriminal or different criminal objective is insufficient to establish attempt.
- Attempted murder requires proof of a specific intent to kill; it must be found as a fact from the evidence and cannot be supplied by presumption from an unlawful or dangerous act.
- An accusatory pleading may charge an offense in statutory language if it provides fair notice; technical defects may be forfeited by failure to demur before trial.
Conclusion
The court reversed because the prosecution proved threats and suspicious preparation but not an unequivocal, direct act toward killing, and because the jury was improperly instructed that it could presume the required specific intent to kill from the commission of an unlawful act.