## Facts

- During an early-morning traffic stop in Oakland, Officer John Frey stopped a vehicle driven by Huey P. Newton and requested backup; Officer Herbert Heanes arrived.
- Frey informed Newton he was under arrest; as Heanes directed Newton to exit the car, a physical struggle occurred.
- Frey was fatally shot, Heanes was shot twice, and Newton sustained a gunshot wound to the abdomen; the sequence and source of shots were disputed.
- A prosecution witness (a bus driver) testified Newton produced a concealed firearm that discharged, striking Heanes, and then Newton fired multiple shots into Frey.
- Newton testified Frey struck him and used racial epithets; after Newton felt a sudden “boiling hot” sensation in his abdomen and heard an “explosion,” he remembered nothing further until he was at a hospital.
- A medical expert testified Newton’s abdominal wound could cause reflex shock and a transient loss of consciousness, and that Newton’s fragmented recollections were medically consistent with such a condition.
- Newton was indicted for murder (Frey), assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer (Heanes), and kidnapping; the trial court granted acquittal on kidnapping after the prosecution rested.
- The jury acquitted Newton of the assault charge, convicted him of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, and found a prior felony allegation true; the trial court denied post-trial motions and sentenced Newton to prison.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing, on its own motion, to instruct the jury that involuntary unconsciousness is a complete defense where evidence could support a finding Newton was unconscious when the fatal shots were fired.
2. Whether the failure to give that instruction improperly removed a material issue supported by the evidence from the jury’s determination.

## Decision

- The court reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- Involuntary unconsciousness, if found, is a complete defense to homicide.
- When evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find involuntary unconsciousness, the trial court must instruct on the defense sua sponte.
- The duty to instruct was not excused by defense counsel’s arguable retreat from the theory.
- The omission was prejudicial because it prevented the jury from considering a potentially dispositive basis for acquittal; instructions on diminished capacity did not substitute for an unconsciousness instruction.

## Legal Principles

- Involuntary unconsciousness may exist even when a person is physically active; it turns on the lack of conscious awareness of one’s acts at the relevant time.
- Involuntary unconsciousness operates as a complete defense because it negates criminal responsibility for acts committed while unconscious.
- A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on defenses that are supported by substantial evidence and that would, if accepted, fully exonerate the defendant.
- An instructional omission that prevents the jury from deciding a material issue raised by the evidence can violate the defendant’s right to have the jury determine all material factual questions necessary to guilt.
- Harmless-error analysis must account for whether the missing instruction would have allowed outright acquittal rather than merely mitigation.

## Conclusion

Because evidence supported a reasonable inference that Newton was involuntarily unconscious during the shooting, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on that complete defense without a request, and its failure to do so required reversal and a new trial.


People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394 (Ct. App. 1970)