## Facts

- Oakland police stopped a Volkswagen driven by Huey P. Newton in the early morning; Officer John Frey initiated the stop and requested backup.
- A struggle and gunfire followed involving Officer Frey, Officer Herbert Heanes, and Newton.
- Frey was shot multiple times and died; Heanes and Newton were also shot.
- The evidence on who fired which shots was sharply disputed.
- A prosecution eyewitness testified Newton produced a concealed firearm, shot Heanes, and then fired into Frey.
- Newton testified he did not have a gun and did not shoot either officer; he described being struck by Frey and then experiencing a sudden hot sensation in his abdomen, hearing an “explosion,” and having only fragmented memories until waking at the hospital.
- A medical expert testified Newton’s description was consistent with an abdominal gunshot wound causing reflex shock and intermittent unconsciousness or semiconsciousness.
- Newton was indicted for murder, assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon, and kidnapping; the trial court acquitted on kidnapping after the prosecution’s case.
- The jury acquitted Newton of the assault charge but convicted him of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder; it also found a prior felony allegation true.
- The trial court denied a new trial motion and probation and imposed a prison sentence.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing, on its own motion, to instruct the jury on involuntary unconsciousness as a complete defense to homicide where evidence supported that theory.
2. Whether an apparent defense withdrawal of a requested unconsciousness instruction relieved the court of any duty to instruct, absent a clear tactical waiver.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the voluntary manslaughter conviction and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that involuntary unconsciousness is a complete defense to criminal homicide.
- Because substantial evidence supported a finding that Newton may have been involuntarily unconscious when the fatal shots were fired, the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense.
- The court rejected the claim of waiver because the record did not clearly show a deliberate, tactical decision to abandon the unconsciousness defense.
- The instructional omission was prejudicial because the jury received only diminished-capacity-type instructions that could mitigate murder to manslaughter but did not permit acquittal on homicide based on unconsciousness.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal liability for homicide requires a conscious, volitional act; involuntary unconsciousness negates the required act and is a complete defense.
- “Unconsciousness” does not require total physical collapse; a person may act physically while not conscious of acting.
- When evidence reasonably supports involuntary unconsciousness, the trial court must instruct on that defense sua sponte as a general principle of law necessary for the jury’s consideration of issues raised by the evidence.
- An ambiguous withdrawal or omission by defense counsel does not waive an instruction on a major, evidence-supported defense absent a clear record of an intentional tactical choice.
- Failure to instruct on a complete, evidence-supported defense can violate the defendant’s right to a jury determination of material issues and requires reversal when prejudice appears.

## Conclusion

The conviction was reversed because the trial court did not instruct the jury, on its own initiative, that involuntary unconsciousness—if found—required acquittal on homicide, and the record contained substantial evidence supporting that defense without a clear, tactical waiver by the defense.


People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)