## Facts

- Gordon G. Patterson and his wife had an unstable marriage involving recurring arguments and physical assaults; she left him, initiated divorce proceedings, and resumed dating neighbor John Northrup.
- On December 27, 1970, Patterson went to his father-in-law’s home carrying a borrowed rifle and saw his wife partially undressed in Northrup’s presence.
- Patterson entered the home and shot Northrup twice in the head at close range, killing him.
- Patterson confessed; after a voluntariness hearing, the confession was admitted at trial.
- At trial, Patterson advanced two theories: (1) the shooting was accidental; and (2) if intentional, he acted under the influence of “extreme emotional disturbance” (EED).
- Under New York law, EED operated as a statutory affirmative defense that, if proven, reduced intentional murder to first-degree manslaughter.
- The jury was instructed that the People had to prove intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, and that Patterson bore the burden to prove EED by a preponderance of the evidence.
- Patterson was convicted of second-degree intentional murder and appealed, arguing the EED burden allocation violated due process.

## Issues

1. Whether New York’s EED mitigation is a true affirmative defense that does not negate the intent element of intentional murder.
2. Whether requiring the defendant to prove EED by a preponderance of the evidence violates due process by impermissibly shifting the burden of disproving an element of murder.
3. Whether the trial court’s jury instructions properly allocated the burdens of proof on intent and EED.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the murder conviction.
- The court held that the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of intentional murder, including intent and causation.
- The court held that EED is an affirmative defense that explains an intentional killing and mitigates culpability, but does not negate intent.
- The court held it was constitutionally permissible to place on the defendant the burden to prove EED by a preponderance of the evidence.

## Legal Principles

- Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the charged offense’s elements.
- A legislature may define mitigating circumstances as affirmative defenses and require the defendant to prove them, if those circumstances do not negate any element the prosecution must prove.
- Extreme emotional disturbance, as defined by statute, functions as a mitigating partial defense for an intentional killing and is not the inverse of the intent element of murder.
- Jury instructions must maintain the prosecution’s burden on intent and other statutory elements even when the defendant bears the burden on an affirmative defense.

## Conclusion

The court upheld New York’s statutory scheme treating extreme emotional disturbance as an affirmative defense that mitigates intentional murder to manslaughter, concluding that assigning the defendant the burden of proof by a preponderance does not violate due process so long as the prosecution remains required to prove intent and all other elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.


People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288 (N.Y. 1976)