## Facts

- P.H., a minor, was charged in juvenile court with attempted first-degree murder, aggravated battery (including with a firearm), and armed violence.
- The State moved to prosecute P.H. under the criminal laws pursuant to a Juvenile Court Act provision requiring transfer when specified conditions are met.
- The provision applied where a petition alleged a minor age 15 or older committed a forcible felony and the State alleged (and the court found) (1) a prior delinquency adjudication for a felony-level act and (2) the present offense was committed in furtherance of organized gang criminal activity.
- The circuit court held the mandatory transfer provision unconstitutional on separation-of-powers grounds, reasoning it conflicted with other Act provisions that allow discretionary transfer.

## Issues

1. Whether the Juvenile Court Act’s mandatory gang-related transfer provision violates the Illinois Constitution’s separation-of-powers doctrine by impermissibly limiting judicial authority or reallocating jurisdiction between juvenile and criminal proceedings.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the circuit court.
- The court held the mandatory gang-transfer provision is constitutional and does not violate separation of powers.
- The cause was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding.

## Legal Principles

- The General Assembly may define the scope of juvenile-court coverage and prescribe when certain minors must be prosecuted under the criminal laws.
- A statute may require a specified legal consequence once a judge finds defined factual predicates; this does not offend separation of powers so long as courts retain their adjudicative role.
- Limiting judicial discretion in a specified category of cases is permissible where the judiciary continues to determine whether statutory conditions are satisfied.

## Conclusion

The court sustained a statutory scheme mandating transfer of certain older juveniles accused of forcible felonies and linked to organized gang activity, concluding that legislative definition of juvenile versus criminal prosecution boundaries—and mandatory consequences upon judicial fact-finding—does not violate separation of powers.


People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 582 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1991)