## Facts

- Investigators received a federal tip that certain county residents may have purchased child pornography online; Robert S. Prinzing was identified as one such resident.
- Detective Keith Smith learned Prinzing had disputed a credit-card charge, leading to a new card number; Smith also obtained Prinzing’s screen name.
- Detectives went to Prinzing’s home representing they were investigating possible fraudulent credit-card charges.
- Smith requested permission to search Prinzing’s computer “in regard to the fraudulent credit card charges,” and Prinzing consented.
- Officers used a forensic preview program and searched for photographic images, focusing on locating content consistent with child pornography rather than data tied to credit-card fraud.
- After locating suspected child-pornography images during the preview, police seized the computer; a later forensic examination produced images supporting nine counts of possession of child pornography.
- Prinzing moved to suppress, arguing consent was obtained by deception and, in any event, police exceeded the scope of any consent; the trial court denied the motion, convicted him in a bench trial, and sentenced him to probation.

## Issues

1. Whether Prinzing’s consent to search was involuntary because it was obtained through police deception about the purpose of the visit and search.
2. Whether, assuming voluntary consent, the officers exceeded the objectively reasonable scope of consent by searching for child-pornography images rather than evidence of credit-card fraud.

## Decision

- The appellate court held Prinzing’s consent was voluntary; deception was relevant but did not, on these facts, invalidate consent.
- The court held the officers exceeded the scope of consent by conducting an image-focused search for child pornography after representing the search was for credit-card fraud-related purposes.
- The court reversed the denial of the suppression motion, reversed the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings.

## Legal Principles

- Police deception is a factor in assessing voluntariness of consent, but it does not automatically render consent involuntary.
- The scope of a consent search is limited by the authorization given and is judged by objective reasonableness—what a typical reasonable person would have understood from the exchange.
- When consent is granted for a defined investigative purpose, officers may not expand the search into a general search for unrelated evidence; evidence obtained from a search exceeding the consent’s scope must be suppressed.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that although consent obtained during a ruse may still be voluntary, officers must keep a computer search within the objectively reasonable limits of the consent communicated; searching broadly for child-pornography images after obtaining consent for a fraud-related search exceeded that scope and required suppression and reversal.


People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2009)