People v. Ramirez, 18 P.3d 822 (2000)

Facts

  • Julio A. Ramirez was separated from his wife, who had a restraining order against him.
  • Ramirez and his wife encountered each other at a bar; she agreed to drive him to a restaurant.
  • During the ride, Ramirez attempted to reconcile; his wife refused and dropped him off.
  • Later that evening, Ramirez made several threatening calls to his wife and to her new boyfriend.
  • Ramirez went to his wife’s home and entered without invitation.
  • Inside the home, Ramirez punched his wife in the face multiple times and held a knife to her throat; she cut her finger while trying to pull away.
  • Ramirez directed his wife to call her boyfriend; instead, she called 911, and the recording captured Ramirez making death threats.
  • The wife fled into a bathroom; Ramirez forced the door open and continued threatening her with the knife until police arrived and arrested him.
  • A jury convicted Ramirez of second-degree assault (after provocation) and felony menacing; it also convicted him of first-degree burglary and found a related crime-of-violence count.
  • After trial, relying on Cooper v. People (decided after the verdict), Ramirez sought a new trial on the burglary and crime-of-violence counts, arguing the burglary instruction did not tell the jury that the intent to commit a crime must exist at the moment of unlawful entry (or unlawful remaining). The trial court granted a new trial on those counts.
  • Ramirez appealed his assault and menacing convictions; the People cross-appealed the order granting a new trial on burglary and the crime-of-violence finding.

Issues

  1. Whether the first-degree burglary instruction was deficient under Cooper v. People because it did not expressly state that the intent to commit a crime must coexist with the unlawful entry (or the point at which remaining became unlawful), and whether the trial court properly granted a new trial on that basis.
  2. Whether Ramirez’s felony menacing conviction could stand when the prosecution relied on the same conduct to prove first-degree burglary (through assault/menacing inside the dwelling) and to support the associated crime-of-violence finding.
  3. Whether asserted instructional and evidentiary errors required reversal of the second-degree assault (after provocation) conviction.

Decision

  • Affirmed Ramirez’s conviction for second-degree assault (after provocation).
  • Vacated Ramirez’s conviction for felony menacing.
  • Reversed the trial court’s order granting a new trial on first-degree burglary and the related crime-of-violence count.
  • Reinstated the first-degree burglary conviction and associated crime-of-violence finding and remanded for correction of the mittimus.
  • Jury instructions are evaluated as a whole; an instruction is not reversible error if, taken together with the remaining instructions, it correctly states the law and fairly informs the jury of what it must find.
  • Under Colorado burglary law, the intent to commit a crime must coincide with the unlawful entry or unlawful remaining; Cooper v. People clarified the timing requirement, but it does not require reversal if the instructions, read together, already required contemporaneous intent.
  • A first-degree burglary instruction that tracks the statutory language (“knowingly enters or remains unlawfully … with intent to commit therein a crime”) may be sufficient to convey the required timing relationship when the case is tried on an unlawful-entry theory.
  • Double jeopardy principles prohibit multiple convictions based on the same act when one conviction, as charged and proved, does not rest on conduct distinct from the other; when the same act of menacing is used to satisfy the burglary component and is also charged as felony menacing, the menacing conviction must be vacated.

Conclusion

The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld Ramirez’s second-degree assault conviction, ruled that the burglary instruction—read with the other instructions—adequately required intent to commit a crime at the time of the unlawful entry consistent with Cooper, reversed the trial court’s grant of a new trial on burglary and the related crime-of-violence finding, reinstated those counts, and vacated the separate felony menacing conviction because it rested on the same conduct used to prove the burglary-based wrongdoing.