## Facts

- In January 1977, in a crowded Rochester bar, Bruce Register and a friend drank heavily throughout the day and evening.
- Register brought a loaded pistol to the bar and earlier displayed it during an argument, but no shots were fired at that time.
- After midnight, during a confrontation involving Register’s friend and another patron, Register fired the gun, wounding a bystander (Lawrence Evans).
- Register then shot the other patron (Willie Mitchell) at close range, seriously injuring him.
- As patrons rushed to leave, Register turned and shot Marvin Lindsey, killing him.
- Register did not dispute firing the shots and relied primarily on evidence of severe voluntary intoxication, including psychiatric testimony, to contest the required mental state.

## Issues

1. Whether voluntary intoxication may be considered to negate the “under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” element of second-degree murder under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2).
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for depraved indifference murder under § 125.25(2).
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by limiting examination and cross-examination of the defense psychiatric expert on intoxication.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment convicting Register of depraved indifference murder and two counts of first-degree assault.
- The court held that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that intoxication could negate “depraved indifference” under § 125.25(2).
- The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to establish reckless conduct creating a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing depraved indifference to human life.
- The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s limitations on psychiatric expert testimony regarding intoxication.

## Legal Principles

- Under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(2), the sole culpable mental state is recklessness; “depraved indifference to human life” is an objective aggravating circumstance describing the surrounding factual setting and the degree of risk.
- Under N.Y. Penal Law § 15.25, voluntary intoxication may negate intent- or knowledge-based mental states, but not recklessness; a defendant who fails to perceive a risk solely due to voluntary intoxication is treated as acting recklessly.
- Because “depraved indifference” is not a separate mens rea element under this framework, an intoxication instruction is not required as to that component of § 125.25(2), even if intoxication is chargeable as to intent-based counts.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Register’s depraved indifference murder conviction, ruling that § 125.25(2) requires proof of recklessness and objectively depraved circumstances, and that voluntary intoxication cannot be used to negate the depraved indifference element or to defeat recklessness under the intoxication statute.


People v. Register, 60 N.Y.2d 270, 457 N.E.2d 704 (N.Y. 1983)