## Facts

- John Ruggles, in a crowded tavern in Salem, New York, loudly uttered a statement insulting Jesus Christ and his mother.
- He spoke in the presence of multiple listeners and was charged with maliciously and publicly blaspheming Christianity.
- A grand jury indicted Ruggles in Washington County in December 1810.
- He was tried in the Court of Oyer and Terminer, convicted, and sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine.
- Ruggles sought review by writ of error in the New York Supreme Court of Judicature, arguing constitutional religious liberty and disestablishment barred punishment.

## Issues

1. Whether malicious public blasphemy against Jesus Christ and Christianity is a punishable common-law offense in New York despite constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and non-establishment.
2. Whether the words proved at trial, as found by the jury and uttered wantonly and maliciously rather than as part of serious religious debate, satisfy the elements of that common-law misdemeanor.

## Decision

- The court unanimously affirmed the conviction and sentence.
- It held that malicious public blasphemy against God, Christ, or the Scriptures remained punishable at common law in New York after independence.
- It concluded the constitutional protection of religious profession and worship did not bar prosecution of conduct treated as an offense against religion, morality, and public order.
- It treated the jury’s verdict as resolving that the words were spoken wantonly and maliciously, not in good-faith religious controversy.

## Legal Principles

- Blasphemy against God, and malicious contemptuous reproaches or profane ridicule of Christ or the Scriptures, is punishable at common law when uttered publicly by words or writings.
- New York received the English common law to the extent applicable, including common-law offenses protecting public morals and social order, independent of any established church.
- Constitutional religious liberty protects profession and worship without preference, but does not prevent punishment of acts that threaten peace, decency, good order, or moral obligation.
- The offense turns on the public, wanton, and malicious character of the attack; reasoned disputes on controverted religious questions are not treated as blasphemy.

## Conclusion

The court sustained a common-law blasphemy conviction for malicious public insults to central Christian figures, reasoning that broad religious toleration is compatible with punishing conduct viewed as undermining public morals and civil order.


People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811)