## Facts

- Robert C. Ryan arranged for a friend, David Hopkins, to order and receive a shipment of hallucinogenic mushrooms for Ryan.
- State police intercepted the package at a Federal Express facility, obtained a warrant, confirmed the contents, resealed it, and delivered it in a controlled delivery to Hopkins.
- Hopkins was arrested after signing for the package and agreed to cooperate with police.
- In a recorded call, Hopkins told Ryan the package contained a large amount of mushrooms and referred to “two pounds”; Ryan responded, “I know, don’t say nothing.”
- Ryan and Hopkins arranged to meet that evening at a firehouse; Hopkins placed the package in Ryan’s car and signaled police, who arrested Ryan.
- Laboratory testing showed the mushrooms contained more than 625 milligrams of a hallucinogen (psilocybin), the statutory threshold for second-degree criminal possession under Penal Law § 220.18(5).
- Ryan had not inspected or handled the mushrooms before arrest, and the prosecution presented no evidence translating “two pounds of mushrooms” into the statutory hallucinogen-milligram threshold.
- At trial, Ryan moved to dismiss for insufficiency on the ground that the prosecution had not proven he knew the relevant weight threshold, sought a lesser-included attempted seventh-degree possession charge (without a weight element), and requested to represent himself; the trial court denied these requests.
- The Appellate Division affirmed, treating the weight element as not requiring proof of knowledge.

## Issues

1. Whether Penal Law § 220.18(5) requires proof that a defendant knew the possessed hallucinogen met or exceeded the statutory weight threshold (625 milligrams).
2. Whether the trial court improperly denied Ryan’s request to represent himself and whether that claim was waived.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction.
- The court held that “knowingly” in Penal Law § 220.18(5) applies to the weight element; the People therefore had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ryan knew the hallucinogen quantity met or exceeded 625 milligrams.
- The evidence was legally insufficient on that mens rea element because the People proved the package exceeded the threshold, but did not prove Ryan knew it did.
- The court also held the trial court denied Ryan’s self-representation request on an improper basis and that Ryan did not waive the issue.
- The matter was remitted for further proceedings consistent with the court’s holdings, including trial on an appropriately graded lesser offense not requiring proof of knowledge of the 625-milligram threshold.

## Legal Principles

- When a statute defines an offense as “knowingly” possessing a controlled substance of a specified weight, the culpable mental state applies to the quantitative element unless the Legislature clearly indicates strict liability.
- Penal statutes are generally construed to require a culpable mental state for each material element; courts should not treat grading elements (such as drug weight thresholds that increase punishment) as strict liability absent clear legislative direction.
- Knowledge of drug weight may be proven circumstantially and may be inferred from evidence such as handling, observation, or other facts supporting an inference of awareness of quantity, but the inference must be supported by evidence in the record.
- A criminal conviction cannot stand where the People prove the fact of the statutory weight but fail to prove the defendant’s knowledge of that weight when the statute requires it.
- A defendant has a constitutional right to self-representation when the request is timely, unequivocal, and accompanied by a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel; denial must rest on permissible grounds, and the claim is not lightly deemed waived.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeals held that Penal Law § 220.18(5) requires proof the defendant knew the possessed hallucinogen met the statutory weight threshold, found the proof insufficient on that element, and also found an improper denial of the defendant’s self-representation request, requiring reversal and further proceedings on a properly graded offense.


People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 626 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1993)