## Facts

- Roy S. Rypinski was involved in an early-morning argument on January 1, 1985, after drinking throughout the evening.
- During the confrontation, he retrieved a rifle from the back seat of his car and the rifle discharged, shooting Gordon Ulrich above the left knee.
- Prosecution witnesses testified that Rypinski threatened to “blow the victim’s brains out” before going to his car.
- Those witnesses also testified that immediately after the discharge, Rypinski said, “I’m sorry, it was an accident. I didn’t mean to hurt anybody.”
- Rypinski testified he had cleaned the rifle the day before and typically kept three rounds in it; he said he ejected the rifle three times during the incident and believed it was unloaded.
- Rypinski testified he did not know how the rifle fired, was shocked, and immediately apologized, claiming the shooting resulted from his mistaken belief that the rifle was unloaded.

## Issues

1. Whether a mistake-of-fact defense under N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(1)(a) can negate the culpable mental state of recklessness for second-degree assault under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05(4).
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact for the reckless-assault charge where evidence supported the defendant’s claimed belief that the rifle was unloaded.
3. Whether the defendant’s mistake must be objectively reasonable to require a mistake-of-fact instruction.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the judgment of conviction.
- The court held the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that mistake of fact could be a defense to the reckless-assault charge.
- The court vacated the sentence and dismissed the indictment, while permitting the People to re-present appropriate charges to another grand jury.
- The court concluded the instructional error was not harmless because it affected the only count on which the jury convicted.

## Legal Principles

- Under N.Y. Penal Law § 15.20(1)(a), a defendant is not criminally liable for conduct committed under a mistaken belief of fact when the mistake, if true, would negate the required culpable mental state.
- Recklessness under N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(3) requires a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk; an honest mistaken belief can negate the required conscious awareness of risk.
- A mistake-of-fact defense in New York does not require objective reasonableness; an honestly held belief may suffice if it would negate the charged mental state.
- A defendant is entitled to a requested instruction when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the defense.

## Conclusion

Because evidence supported Rypinski’s claim that he honestly believed the rifle was unloaded, the jury should have been instructed that such a mistake of fact could negate recklessness; the refusal to give that instruction required reversal, vacatur of sentence, and dismissal with leave to re-present.


People v. Rypinski, 157 A.D.2d 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1990)