People v. Salas, 7 Cal. 3d 812, 500 P.2d 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 431 (Cal. 1972)

Facts

  • Shortly after midnight on June 7, 1968, Francisco Carrasco Salas entered the Hub Bar in Sacramento, drew a pistol on bartender George Finnegan, and demanded money.
  • Salas ordered two patrons to lie on the floor, took about $150 from a cash register into a cloth bank bag, threatened to shoot if anyone moved, and left the bar.
  • A friend, Arlin Damion, waited in a car outside; Salas entered the passenger side and Damion drove away with Salas and the money.
  • A deputy sheriff received a robbery broadcast and stopped the car about 1.2 miles from the bar within a few minutes of the robbery.
  • When the deputy approached, Salas shot and fatally wounded him, then fled on foot and was soon apprehended.
  • Salas was convicted by a jury of first-degree robbery and first-degree murder on a felony-murder theory; the jury fixed the murder penalty at death.

Issues

  1. Whether the deputy’s killing occurred “in the perpetration of” the robbery, making it first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
  2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to give a requested instruction defining “scrambling possession” of the robbery proceeds.
  3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the robbery was still ongoing (no place of temporary safety; continued flight) when the killing occurred.
  4. Whether the death penalty imposed could stand after intervening decisions invalidating existing capital punishment schemes.

Decision

  • The court held the homicide occurred during the continuing perpetration of the robbery; the robbery had not terminated because Salas had not reached a place of temporary safety and was still in immediate flight with the loot.
  • The court held it was not reversible error to refuse a specific “scrambling possession” definition where the jury was instructed on continued flight and the requirement of reaching a place of temporary safety.
  • The court held the evidence supported the jury’s finding that the robbery was ongoing when the deputy was killed.
  • The court modified the judgment to reduce the death sentence to life imprisonment and otherwise affirmed.
  • For felony-murder purposes, a robbery continues through the escape phase until the perpetrators reach a place of temporary safety; the felony does not necessarily end upon leaving the premises.
  • A killing during immediate flight from a robbery, before the perpetrators reach temporary safety while still in possession of the proceeds, is “in the perpetration of” the robbery and supports first-degree felony-murder.
  • A trial court does not commit prejudicial instructional error by declining to define “scrambling possession” where the instructions adequately direct the jury to decide whether the perpetrators had completed escape by reaching a place of temporary safety.
  • When governing constitutional law invalidates a death penalty scheme, an imposed death sentence must be replaced with life imprisonment while leaving unaffected convictions and other lawful portions of the judgment.

Conclusion

The court affirmed Salas’s felony-murder and robbery convictions, concluding the robbery continued during immediate flight when the deputy was killed, and modified the punishment from death to life imprisonment due to intervening constitutional limits on capital sentencing.