## Facts

- Illinois enacted the Hunter Interference Prohibition Act, which made it a misdemeanor to “disturb[]” a person engaged in lawful taking of a wild animal “with intent to dissuade or otherwise prevent the taking.”
- The Act defined “taking” broadly to include travel, camping, and other preparatory acts on lands or waters where the person had the right to take wildlife.
- The State charged Robert Sanders under the “disturbs” provision, alleging that he yelled at and photographed a person as she attempted to shoot a deer.
- Sanders moved to dismiss the charge, arguing the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fifth Amendments.
- The circuit court dismissed the information, finding the provision vague and overbroad; the State took a direct appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether the statute criminalizing “disturb[ing]” lawful hunting activity “with intent to dissuade” is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment for overbreadth and viewpoint discrimination.
2. Whether the statute’s key terms and scope render it unconstitutionally vague in a way that chills protected expression and invites arbitrary enforcement.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the charge.
- The court held the challenged provision facially unconstitutional as overbroad under the First Amendment.
- The court determined the provision was content- and viewpoint-based because it punished expression intended to discourage hunting while leaving encouraging expression unpunished.
- The court concluded the statute swept in substantial protected speech (e.g., peaceful persuasion, protest, and documenting hunters) beyond any legitimate regulation of nonexpressive interference.
- The court declined to adopt a narrowing construction, reasoning the text was not readily susceptible to a limiting interpretation without judicial rewriting.
- Having resolved the case on overbreadth grounds, the court did not need to decide all vagueness arguments, though it noted related concerns.

## Legal Principles

- A law is facially overbroad when it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate applications.
- Viewpoint discrimination—penalizing speech because it expresses disfavored ideas or intent (here, intent to dissuade)—is presumptively invalid under the First Amendment.
- Statutory terms that broadly criminalize “disturbing” others based on communicative intent can chill protected expression and increase the risk of arbitrary enforcement.
- Courts may apply narrowing constructions only when a statute is genuinely susceptible to a limiting interpretation; courts will not rewrite statutory text to cure constitutional defects.

## Conclusion

The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Act’s provision criminalizing “disturb[ing]” lawful hunting with intent to dissuade was facially overbroad and viewpoint-discriminatory, and it affirmed dismissal of the prosecution.


People v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. 1998)