## Facts

- Joel Steinberg and Hedda Nussbaum lived with two children in their apartment, including six-year-old Lisa Steinberg.
- On the evening of November 1, 1987, Lisa entered Steinberg’s bedroom while he dressed to go out; shortly after, he emerged carrying Lisa unconscious and limp, with raspy breathing.
- Nussbaum testified Steinberg later said he had “knocked [Lisa] down and she didn’t want to get up again.”
- Steinberg did not seek immediate medical assistance; he left for dinner and instructed Nussbaum to let Lisa sleep.
- After returning, Steinberg still did not obtain medical care and instead used cocaine for hours while Lisa remained unconscious.
- Around 6:00 a.m., after Lisa stopped breathing, Steinberg agreed to call 911; Lisa was hospitalized, placed on life support, declared brain-dead, and died after life support was removed.
- Medical evidence showed severe blunt head trauma of great force and signs of prior abuse.
- Steinberg was indicted for, among other charges, depraved indifference murder and first-degree manslaughter; the jury acquitted on murder and convicted on first-degree manslaughter (intent to cause serious physical injury). The Appellate Division affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant without medical expertise can, as a matter of law, form the intent to cause serious physical injury by failing to obtain medical care for a child.
2. Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove Steinberg inflicted the head trauma and, through acts and omissions, acted with intent to cause serious physical injury.
3. Whether Nussbaum’s testimony, assuming she was an accomplice, was sufficiently corroborated under CPL 60.22.
4. Whether the trial court committed reversible error in its supplemental instruction on intent and in requiring jurors to consider lesser included offenses only after unanimously rejecting the greater charge.

## Decision

- The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for first-degree manslaughter.
- The court held medical expertise is not required to form intent to cause serious physical injury where the defendant fails to obtain medical care despite obvious need.
- The court held the evidence, viewed most favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient to support the verdict, including proof of forceful trauma, awareness of Lisa’s condition, prolonged delay in seeking care, and misleading statements consistent with consciousness of guilt.
- The court held there was sufficient independent evidence tending to connect Steinberg to the offense to satisfy CPL 60.22 corroboration, even assuming accomplice status.
- The court held the supplemental intent charge and the “acquit-first” submission of greater and lesser counts were consistent with New York law and did not deprive defendant of a fair trial.

## Legal Principles

- Under New York law, intent is a “conscious objective” to cause a result and does not require specialized medical knowledge.
- Criminal liability may rest on an omission when the defendant has a legal duty to act; caregivers standing in a parental role have a duty to obtain necessary medical care for a child.
- For first-degree manslaughter (Penal Law § 125.20(1)), the jury may infer intent to cause serious physical injury from the defendant’s actions and surrounding circumstances, including a prolonged failure to secure medical assistance despite obvious distress.
- Corroboration under CPL 60.22 is satisfied by independent evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; it need not prove guilt by itself.
- A trial court may instruct jurors to consider lesser included offenses only after unanimously rejecting the greater charge, consistent with New York practice.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Steinberg’s first-degree manslaughter conviction, ruling that intent to cause serious physical injury can be inferred from a caregiver’s abusive conduct combined with a knowing, extended refusal to obtain medical care for a gravely injured child, even without medical training, and that the corroboration and jury-instruction claims did not warrant reversal.


People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673 (N.Y. 1992)