## Facts

- Michael Jerome Sutton and Willie J. Jackson were jointly charged in Los Angeles County with felony offenses arising from the sale of a controlled substance.
- California Penal Code § 1382 required trial within 60 days of arraignment unless defendants consented or good cause justified delay.
- Trial was initially set for day 53 after arraignment.
- On day 53, Jackson’s appointed counsel reported he was in trial in other matters; the court reset trial to day 56.
- On day 56, counsel reported he remained in another trial expected to finish by day 60.
- On day 60, counsel’s other trial was still ongoing; the court continued the matter day-to-day beyond day 60 without defendants’ consent and found good cause based on counsel’s unavailability.
- Trial began on day 66; both defendants were convicted.
- Sutton moved to dismiss under § 1382; the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed; the California Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether “good cause” under Penal Code § 1382 permits continuing a joint felony trial beyond 60 days without defendants’ consent when appointed counsel is engaged in another trial that unexpectedly runs long but is expected to end soon.
2. Whether such a good-cause finding conflicts with prior authority condemning delays caused by chronic government failure to provide sufficient defense resources.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgments and upheld the denial of the § 1382 dismissal motion.
- The court held good cause supported the brief delay from day 60 to day 66 because appointed counsel was still in an ongoing trial that had lasted longer than anticipated and was nearing completion.
- The court clarified that broad language suggesting counsel’s other-trial commitments can never constitute good cause was overbroad.
- The court distinguished prior cases addressing lengthy delays attributable to chronic, systemic resource deficiencies, as opposed to a short, case-specific conflict closely monitored by the trial court.

## Legal Principles

- Under Penal Code § 1382, charges must be dismissed if trial does not begin within 60 days and the defendant does not consent, unless the prosecution shows good cause for delay.
- Good cause is determined case-by-case, considering whether the delay is reasonably necessary and whether the court acted diligently to bring the case to trial promptly.
- A brief continuance may constitute good cause when caused by appointed counsel’s engagement in another trial that unexpectedly extends, if the delay is limited and tied to counsel’s actual availability.
- Delays driven by chronic or systemic government failure to provide adequate defense resources do not constitute good cause.
- In joint trials, the good-cause assessment may consider the practical effects of severance, substitution of counsel, duplicative proceedings, and related burdens on parties and the court.

## Conclusion

The court held that a short, day-to-day continuance beyond the 60-day statutory period was justified by good cause where appointed counsel’s other trial unexpectedly extended, the court monitored the delay and commenced trial promptly once counsel became available, and the circumstances did not reflect systemic resource failures.


People v. Sutton, 48 Cal. 4th 533, 227 P.3d 437 (Cal. 2010)