## Facts

- Jason Markeith Thompson worked as a caregiver in a group home for developmentally disabled adults.
- The victim, Renee R., was a resident with developmental disabilities, including Down syndrome, and markedly limited cognitive functioning.
- Thompson committed and admitted multiple sexual acts with Renee, including acts covered by statutes prohibiting sex with a person incapable of giving legal consent due to developmental disability.
- Renee did not physically resist and later described the acts but claimed she had been “in a deep sleep,” reflecting dissociation rather than consent.
- The prosecution proceeded solely on the theory that Renee was incapable of giving legal consent and that Thompson knew or reasonably should have known of her incapacity; force and actual-consent theories were not pursued.
- At trial, the principal dispute was whether Renee’s developmental disability made her incapable of legal consent “at the time and under the circumstances,” despite her limited, childlike understanding of sex and a prior sexual experience.

## Issues

1. Whether substantial evidence supported the finding that Renee was incapable of giving legal consent to the charged sexual acts due to developmental disability, under the circumstances.
2. Whether the statutes criminalizing sexual acts with a developmentally disabled person “incapable of giving legal consent,” when the defendant knows or reasonably should know of the incapacity, are unconstitutionally vague as applied.

## Decision

- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of conviction.
- The court held substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Renee’s developmental disability, particularly her impaired understanding of the sexual acts involved, rendered her incapable of giving legal consent under the circumstances.
- The court rejected the vagueness challenge, concluding the statutory standard is sufficiently definite, especially because liability requires proof the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the victim’s incapacity.

## Legal Principles

- California law makes it a felony to engage in specified sexual acts with a person who is so developmentally disabled as to be incapable of giving legal consent, if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the incapacity.
- Legal incapacity to consent is not a categorical status for all developmentally disabled adults; it is assessed “at the time and under the circumstances,” including the person’s understanding of the nature of the sexual conduct and its implications.
- Apparent verbal assent or prior sexual experience does not preclude a finding of legal incapacity where the evidence shows a substantially impaired, childlike, or confused understanding of the acts.
- A knowledge or reason-to-know requirement can supply meaningful notice and limit arbitrary enforcement, supporting rejection of an as-applied vagueness challenge.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Thompson’s convictions because the evidence permitted a finding that Renee lacked sufficient understanding to give legal consent under the circumstances, and the statutory scheme was not unconstitutionally vague given its incapacity standard coupled with a requirement that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the incapacity.


People v. Thompson, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803 (Ct. App. 2006)