Facts
- David Francis Trinkle drank heavily at a tavern; the bartender refused further service due to intoxication.
- Trinkle went to another bar, drank more, bought a .357 handgun, returned near the first tavern, and fired at the building, wounding a patron (Gayle Lane).
- The State indicted Trinkle for attempted murder, alleging he shot Lane “knowing” the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.
Issues
- Under the Illinois Criminal Code, does attempted murder require proof of a specific intent to kill?
- Are an indictment and jury instructions defective if they permit an attempted murder conviction based on knowledge that the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm?
Decision
- The Illinois Supreme Court held attempted murder is a specific-intent offense requiring proof of intent to kill.
- The court ruled the attempted murder indictment and issues instruction were insufficient because they used the murder statute’s “knowledge/strong probability” mental-state formulation rather than intent to kill.
- The court affirmed the appellate court’s modification of the conviction from attempted murder to aggravated battery and its reduction of the sentence.
Legal Principles
- Criminal attempt requires intent to commit a specific offense plus a substantial step toward committing that offense.
- Because murder may be proven by mental states short of intent to kill, those alternative mental states do not automatically supply the mens rea for attempted murder.
- Attempted murder cannot be sustained on proof that the defendant merely knew his conduct created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm; the State must prove intent to kill.
- A charging instrument and jury instructions for attempted murder must require a finding of intent to kill; using a “strong probability” standard misstates the elements.
- An appellate court may modify a conviction to a supported lesser offense and adjust the sentence when the attempted murder conviction fails on the intent element.
Conclusion
The court required proof of specific intent to kill for attempted murder and affirmed modification of the judgment to aggravated battery where the indictment and instructions allowed conviction on a knowledge-of-probability-of-harm theory.