Facts
- Francis Unger was incarcerated at the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet serving a 1–3 year sentence for auto theft.
- He was transferred to the minimum-security honor farm on February 23, 1972.
- Unger left the honor farm on March 7, 1972, and was arrested two days later in a motel room, still wearing prison clothing.
- Unger testified that before the transfer an inmate threatened him with a knife to force sexual acts; he did not report it due to fear of retaliation.
- He testified that after transfer he was assaulted and sexually molested by three inmates and then received additional threats.
- On the day of the escape, Unger testified he received a phone call threatening him with death because the caller believed Unger had reported the assault.
- Unger testified he left to save his life and intended to return after finding someone who could help him; he did not report the incidents to prison authorities.
- At trial, the court refused Unger’s requested jury instructions on the statutory defenses of necessity and compulsion and instructed the jury that Unger’s reasons for leaving could not be considered as a defense.
- A jury convicted Unger of escape; the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial; the state appealed.
Issues
- Whether Unger presented some evidence supporting the statutory affirmative defenses of necessity and compulsion sufficient to require jury instructions in an escape prosecution.
- Whether it was reversible error to instruct the jury to disregard Unger’s reasons for leaving and to refuse to submit necessity and compulsion to the jury.
Decision
- The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court’s reversal and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held that Unger’s testimony provided some evidence supporting necessity (and potentially compulsion), requiring that the defenses be submitted to the jury by instruction.
- The court held the trial court erred by refusing the requested defense instructions and by instructing the jury that Unger’s reasons could not constitute a defense.
Legal Principles
- A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on a theory of defense when there is “some evidence” supporting it, even if the evidence is weak, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.
- Illinois necessity justifies conduct the defendant reasonably believes is necessary to avoid a greater injury, provided the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation.
- Necessity is not categorically unavailable in prison escape prosecutions; it may apply where the escape is claimed to avoid imminent serious harm and the defendant’s conduct otherwise fits the statutory justification.
- Necessity and compulsion are distinct: compulsion involves coercion by threat from another person to commit the offense, while necessity concerns choosing the lesser harm under circumstances creating pressure to violate the law.
- An instruction that categorically bars the jury from considering the defendant’s asserted justification improperly withdraws a legislatively recognized defense from the jury’s consideration.
Conclusion
The court ordered a new trial because Unger’s testimony supplied some evidence that his escape was justified by necessity (and possibly compulsion), and the trial court’s instructions improperly prevented the jury from considering those defenses.