## Facts

- Whitfield was a repeat DUI offender who had attended a repeat-offender program that depicted the lethal consequences of drunk driving.
- On November 17, 1990, witnesses observed Whitfield swerving across lanes and over a double yellow line before a head-on collision that killed the other driver instantly.
- A witness saw Whitfield’s head nodding shortly before impact, suggesting he was fighting sleep.
- A paramedic found Whitfield unconscious in his vehicle; the car smelled strongly of alcohol and contained empty malt-liquor cans.
- A blood draw about two hours after the collision showed a BAC of 0.24%; expert testimony estimated his BAC at the time of collision at about 0.27%.
- A psychologist testified that BACs above 0.25% can cause stupor and loss of consciousness.
- Whitfield admitted drinking multiple 16-ounce malt liquors and claimed he did not remember the collision; after learning someone died, he said, “Take me straight to the gas chamber, [I] killed somebody.”
- Charged offenses included second-degree murder and multiple DUI-related counts tied to prior convictions and a suspended or revoked license.

## Issues

1. Whether, under former Penal Code § 22, evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to dispute whether the defendant harbored malice aforethought, including implied malice, in a second-degree murder prosecution.
2. Whether the trial court erred by refusing the defendant’s requested instruction that unconsciousness from voluntary intoxication, coupled with no intent to kill and no malice, required a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.

## Decision

- The California Supreme Court affirmed the second-degree murder conviction and associated DUI-related convictions.
- The court held that, under former Penal Code § 22, voluntary intoxication evidence is admissible on whether the defendant actually harbored malice aforethought, whether express or implied.
- The court held the trial court’s instructions on voluntary intoxication and implied-malice murder versus gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated were correct.
- The court held there was no instructional error in refusing Whitfield’s proposed unconsciousness instruction in the form requested.

## Legal Principles

- Under former Penal Code § 22, voluntary intoxication evidence may be considered on whether the defendant actually formed the mental state of malice aforethought; the statute does not distinguish between express and implied malice for this purpose.
- Implied-malice second-degree murder requires an intentional act, dangerous natural consequences, and performance of the act with knowledge of the danger and conscious disregard for human life.
- In drunk-driving murder cases, prior DUI convictions and formal education about drunk-driving risks may support an inference of subjective awareness of risk and conscious disregard when the defendant nevertheless chooses to drive while highly intoxicated.
- A claimed intoxication-related loss of consciousness near the time of impact does not necessarily negate implied malice if the jury can find malice was formed earlier (for example, when deciding to drive despite known dangers).
- Refusal of a defense instruction is not reversible error when the jury is otherwise properly instructed on the relevant mental-state doctrines and the proposed instruction is unnecessary or potentially misleading.

## Conclusion

The court clarified that former Penal Code § 22 permits voluntary intoxication evidence to contest malice aforethought, including implied malice, but upheld the murder conviction because the jury was properly instructed and could reasonably find Whitfield formed implied malice by choosing to drive while extremely intoxicated despite known lethal risks.


People v. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th 437, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (Cal. 1994)