## Facts

- James Williams (defendant) was charged by complaint in the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County, with **fraudulent accosting** under **N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30**.
- The complaint alleged that Williams **accosted unknown passersby in a public place** and engaged in **three-card monte**, described as conduct commonly performed in perpetration of a known confidence game.
- An officer allegedly observed Williams **receive U.S. currency as a wager** from another individual and observed Williams **possess three playing cards**.
- Williams moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint was defective because it contained **no finding and no allegation of specific intent to defraud**, which he claimed is an essential element of § 165.30(1).
- The People opposed dismissal, relying on **§ 165.30(2)**, which provides that a person who makes statements or engages in conduct commonly used in a known confidence game **is presumed to intend to defraud**; the People argued three-card monte fits that category.
- The court treated the motion as a pretrial challenge to the **facial sufficiency** of the accusatory instrument and addressed a question the court described as previously undecided in New York: whether three-card monte is a “known confidence game” for purposes of § 165.30(2).

## Issues

1. Whether **three-card monte** is a “known type of confidence game” under **N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30(2)** so that a defendant who conducts it is **presumed to intend to defraud**.
2. If the § 165.30(2) presumption applies, whether a complaint that alleges the defendant accosted passersby and conducted three-card monte is **facially sufficient** even without an express allegation of specific intent to defraud.

## Decision

- The court held that **three-card monte is a known type of confidence game** within the meaning of **N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30(2)**.
- Because the statutory presumption applies, the element of **intent to defraud** was adequately supported at the pleading stage.
- **Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was denied**, and the prosecution was permitted to proceed.

## Legal Principles

- Fraudulent accosting under **N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30(1)** requires that the defendant accost a person in a public place **with intent to defraud** by means of a trick, swindle, or confidence game.
- **N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30(2)** provides an evidentiary presumption: when a person makes statements or engages in conduct of a kind commonly used in perpetration of a **known** confidence game, that person **is presumed to intend to defraud**.
- A court assessing a motion to dismiss an accusatory instrument may consider whether the facts alleged fit within a statutory presumption that supplies an element (here, intent) for pleading purposes.
- In deciding whether a scheme is a “known” confidence game, the court may look to common understanding and legal treatment of the scheme, including descriptions showing that the “game” is typically run through deception (for example, sleight-of-hand or use of confederates to induce wagers).
- When the complaint identifies the scheme as three-card monte and alleges conduct consistent with operating it (accosting passersby, taking a wager, possessing the cards), that identification can be enough to invoke § 165.30(2) at the accusatory stage.

## Conclusion

People v. Williams holds that three-card monte qualifies as a “known type of confidence game” under N.Y. Penal Law § 165.30(2), so the statute’s presumption of intent to defraud applies; accordingly, a complaint alleging that the defendant accosted passersby and conducted three-card monte was legally sufficient, and the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied.


People v. Williams, 402 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1978)