## Facts

- Gerald A. Young saw what appeared to be two middle-aged men beating an approximately 18-year-old boy on a New York City sidewalk.
- Believing the boy was being unlawfully assaulted, Young intervened and punched the two men.
- The two men were actually plainclothes detectives attempting to arrest the boy for disorderly conduct, and the boy was resisting.
- Young did not know the men were police officers.
- Young was charged with and convicted of criminal assault in the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York based on striking the detectives.

## Issues

1. Whether an honest and reasonable mistake of fact that a third person is being unlawfully assaulted negates the criminal intent required for assault when the defendant intentionally strikes the apparent assailants to defend the third person.
2. Whether justification or mistake-of-fact principles permit a bystander to use force in defense of another based on reasonable appearances, even if the force is used against a lawful actor acting within authority.

## Decision

- The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the information.
- The majority held Young lacked the requisite criminal intent for assault because he acted under an honest and reasonable belief that he was protecting the boy from an unlawful beating.
- A two-judge dissent would have affirmed on the view that third-party intervention is justified only in limited circumstances and otherwise occurs at the intervenor’s risk.

## Legal Principles

- Criminal assault requires a culpable mental state; a reasonable, good-faith mistake of fact may negate that element when the defendant’s purpose is to protect another rather than to commit a criminal injury.
- In defense-of-others situations, a defendant may rely on reasonable appearances; criminal liability does not necessarily turn on whether the perceived assault was objectively unlawful if the defendant’s mistake is honest and reasonable.
- Criminal adjudication focuses on societal condemnation of culpable conduct; strict “at your peril” concepts associated with civil liability need not control the criminal intent analysis.

## Conclusion

The court set aside the assault conviction because Young’s intentional striking of the detectives occurred while he reasonably and in good faith believed he was defending a youth from an unlawful beating, which the majority concluded defeated the intent required for criminal assault and warranted dismissal.


People v. Young, 210 N.Y.S.2d 358 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1961)