## Facts

- A testatrix left her residuary estate in trust for her son for life.
- As to one-third of the residuary estate, the will directed that after the son’s death the trustee pay income to the son’s “widow” for life.
- Upon the widow’s death or remarriage, the will directed distribution of that one-third to the son’s children then living and descendants then living of deceased children, or if none, to those who would then be the son’s next of kin.
- When the will was executed, the son was unmarried but engaged; he married shortly thereafter. His first wife survived the testatrix but predeceased the son; the son later remarried, and the second wife also predeceased him.
- A trustee sought judicial construction of the one-third disposition.
- The son’s estate (through its executors) argued the remainder after the widow’s interest was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities, producing a reversion and partial intestacy.
- The trial court agreed, invalidating the post-widow limitation and recognizing a reversion; other interested parties appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the remainder following the life estate to the son’s “widow” (to children and descendants living at the widow’s death or remarriage, or if none to next of kin) was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
2. Whether “widow” referred to the son’s then-fiancée/first wife specifically or to whoever might be the son’s widow at his death.
3. Whether prior court-approved compromise and related proceedings involving the son and his spouse(s) estopped the son’s executors from asserting a perpetuities challenge.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decree.
- “Widow” was construed as a descriptive term meaning whoever would be the son’s widow at his death, not a reference to a particular woman.
- The post-widow class remainder violated the Rule Against Perpetuities because, under the terms of the gift, the class could include descendants not necessarily born within lives in being plus twenty-one years (and gestation).
- Because the remainder was an invalid class gift, the entire limitation failed rather than being saved for permissible class members.
- The invalid limitation left an absolute and indefeasible reversion in the testatrix as to that one-third, which passed to her heirs/next of kin, producing partial intestacy.
- Prior compromise and related proceedings did not estop the executors from litigating the validity and construction of the future interests.

## Legal Principles

- A future interest is void if it may vest, if at all, beyond a life or lives in being at the time of creation plus twenty-one years (and gestation); validity is tested by what might happen, not by actual events.
- A class gift conditioned on membership at a future time is invalid if the class, as defined, may include persons whose interests could vest outside the perpetuities period.
- When a class gift is too remote as to some potential class members, the entire class gift fails (all-or-nothing rule).
- A doctrine treating a class interest as vesting upon birth of a class member cannot validate a limitation that is, by its terms, potentially too remote.
- In testamentary construction, “widow” is generally a term of description for the person who survives as spouse at death, absent clear intent to identify a particular individual.
- Estoppel from prior compromise or income-rights proceedings requires a binding resolution of the later-presented construction/validity question; agreements addressing practical administration do not necessarily bar later perpetuities challenges by successors.

## Conclusion

The court held that the will’s remainder after a life estate to the son’s “widow” was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities because it could vest too remotely in descendants, construed “widow” as whoever survived the son, rejected estoppel based on prior proceedings, and affirmed that the failed limitation left a reversion in the testatrix resulting in partial intestacy as to the one-third share.


Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672 (Md. 1944)