## Facts

- Hunter and Mary Perrin were interested in buying a home in Lake Charles, Louisiana.
- On a Sunday afternoon, they drove through the Graywood subdivision, where multiple homes and townhomes were in various stages of construction and sales activity.
- The Perrins saw a townhome that appeared near completion and potentially available for purchase.
- A sign against the exterior wall advertised Randy Tupper Homes (also referred to in the record as Fantasy Homes, Inc.) and included contact names and a telephone number.
- There were no signs, warning tape, barricades, or other notices on the property forbidding entry.
- The ground leading from the street to the garage area was damp, and a series of wooden pallets had been placed on the ground to form a makeshift walkway allowing access to the home.
- As Mary Perrin walked across the pallets, she fell and allegedly injured her right shoulder.
- The Perrins sued Randy Tupper Homes and its general liability insurer, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, seeking tort damages based on the fall.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the Perrins were criminal trespassers under La. R.S. 14:63 and that La. R.S. 14:63(H) provided civil immunity to the property owner against claims by criminal trespassers.
- The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed the Perrins’ claims, concluding they entered without express or implied consent and were trespassers in violation of La. R.S. 14:63.
- The Perrins appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the Perrins’ entry onto the townhome property constituted criminal trespass under La. R.S. 14:63, such that Defendants were immune from civil liability under La. R.S. 14:63(H).
2. Whether, on the undisputed facts, La. R.S. 14:63(F)(3) authorized the Perrins to enter the property as persons with a legitimate reason to conduct business or communicate with the owner/custodian, absent any oral or written prohibition.

## Decision

- The court of appeal reversed the summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court held the trial court committed legal error in interpreting and applying La. R.S. 14:63 to classify the Perrins as criminal trespassers.
- The court concluded that, under La. R.S. 14:63(F)(3), the Perrins fell within a category of persons allowed to enter immovable property unless specifically forbidden, and they were not specifically forbidden to enter.
- Because the Perrins were not criminal trespassers, Defendants could not rely on La. R.S. 14:63(H) immunity to obtain summary judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Summary judgment is proper only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; statutory interpretation and application can present questions of law.
- Under La. R.S. 14:63, criminal trespass requires entry or remaining on immovable property without “express, legal, or implied authorization.”
- La. R.S. 14:63(F)(3) identifies persons who may enter or remain on another’s immovable property unless “specifically forbidden” orally or in writing, including a real estate licensee or “other person who has a legitimate reason” for conducting business or communicating with the owner, lessee, custodian, or resident and who, upon entry, seeks to conduct that business or communication.
- When an entrant falls within La. R.S. 14:63(F)(3) and has not been specifically forbidden to enter, the entrant does not commit criminal trespass under the statute.
- Civil immunity under La. R.S. 14:63(H) applies only when the plaintiff is a criminal trespasser; if the entrant is statutorily authorized to enter, the immunity does not bar a negligence claim.

## Conclusion

Because the Perrins entered a property in a development actively being built and sold, saw a builder sign with contact information, and encountered no oral or written prohibition against entry, the court held they were among the persons authorized by La. R.S. 14:63(F)(3) to enter for a legitimate business purpose, so they were not criminal trespassers and the builder and insurer could not use La. R.S. 14:63(H) immunity to support summary judgment; the dismissal was reversed and the case returned to the trial court.


Perrin v. Randy Tupper Homes, 21 So. 3d 474 (2009)