Perry v. State, 155 So. 3d 390 (2014)

Facts

  • Christopher S. Perry lived with his wife, Mary Perry, and their three children, including eight-year-old E.P.
  • The Perrys allowed Robert Young, a close friend of Christopher’s, to move into their home even though they knew Young was a registered sex offender who had been convicted of molesting his stepdaughter.
  • The adults relied on Young for financial support, and Christopher and Mary engaged in sexual activity with Young.
  • Despite Young’s history, the Perrys permitted him extensive access to the children, including allowing Young to sleep in E.P.’s bedroom and bathe her.
  • After the Department of Children and Families (DCF) received a report that an adult male was sleeping with E.P., the Perrys signed a safety plan agreeing that Young would have no unsupervised contact with their children.
  • The Perrys nonetheless continued allowing Young to sleep in E.P.’s bed.
  • After a second DCF report, E.P. disclosed that Young was sexually abusing her in multiple ways.
  • Investigators observed a lock on the outside of E.P.’s bedroom door; E.P. said her parents used it to lock her in the room with Young.
  • Mary later admitted she saw Young sexually abusing E.P., told Christopher about it, and neither parent took steps to stop it.
  • The Perrys continued denying that Young slept with E.P. and told investigators he slept on the couch.
  • Christopher was charged and convicted of multiple counts, including capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation as a principal based on Young’s acts, felony child neglect, and conspiracy with Mary and Mary’s mother to commit capital sexual battery on E.P.
  • Christopher appealed, challenging (among other points) the sufficiency of the evidence for principal liability and for conspiracy, and objecting to evidence about adult sexual conduct.

Issues

  1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Perry as a principal to capital sexual battery and lewd or lascivious molestation committed by Young.
  2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Perry of felony child neglect based on his failure to protect E.P. from known, ongoing abuse.
  3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove a conspiracy between Perry, his wife, and his mother-in-law to commit capital sexual battery—specifically, whether the State proved an agreement to commit the offense.

Decision

  • The First District Court of Appeal affirmed Perry’s convictions and sentences on the principal-liability sexual-offense counts and the felony child-neglect count.
  • The court reversed the conspiracy conviction, holding the evidence did not legally establish an agreement among Perry, his wife, and his mother-in-law to commit capital sexual battery.
  • The case was remanded with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count.
  • The court otherwise affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the remaining issues raised on appeal.
  • Under Florida’s principal statute, a defendant may be convicted as a principal if the State proves the defendant intended that the crime be committed and did some act to assist, encourage, or otherwise help bring about the offense; mere presence is not enough. (§ 777.011, Fla. Stat.)
  • A criminal conspiracy requires proof of an express or implied agreement between two or more persons to commit a criminal offense, together with intent to commit that offense. (§ 777.04(3), Fla. Stat.)
  • Evidence that a defendant knew about the crime, was present, or even aided the substantive offense does not by itself prove the separate element of an agreement required for conspiracy.
  • The agreement element of conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence, but the circumstances must support a reasonable inference that the alleged conspirators agreed to commit the charged offense.
  • On review of a denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, an appellate court views the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State, but reverses if the evidence is legally insufficient to establish an element of the offense.

Conclusion

The First District held that the evidence supported Perry’s convictions for sexual offenses as a principal and for felony child neglect based on his knowing facilitation of Young’s access to E.P. and his failure to protect her, even after official warnings. However, the court ruled that the same record did not provide legally sufficient proof that Perry entered into an agreement with his wife and mother-in-law to commit capital sexual battery, so it reversed the conspiracy conviction and directed entry of a judgment of acquittal on that count.