## Facts

- In 1893, James F. Peters conveyed approximately forty square rods (about one-quarter acre) in Carbon County, Pennsylvania, to the East Penn Township School District.
- The deed’s habendum clause granted the property to the district and its assigns “as long as it is used for public school purposes.”
- The deed’s warranty clause repeated the same “as long as it is used for public school purposes” language.
- The school district later ceased using the property for public school purposes.
- The district initiated proceedings to sell the property to a purchaser and sought to convey fee simple title, but the title could not be delivered free of dispute.
- Earl C. Peters, an heir of the grantor, filed an ejectment action alleging the district held only a fee simple determinable and that title had automatically reverted to the grantor’s heirs when school use ended.
- The matter was submitted in the trial court on a case stated; the trial court entered a special verdict for the school district, concluding the language stated only the purpose of the conveyance and that the district owned a fee simple absolute.
- Peters appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

## Issues

1. Did the deed language conveying the land to the school district and its assigns “as long as it is used for public school purposes” create a fee simple determinable that terminated automatically when the property stopped being used for school purposes, or did it merely express the deed’s purpose while conveying a fee simple absolute?

## Decision

- The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the judgment for the school district.
- The court held that the repeated “as long as” language was language of limitation and created a fee simple determinable.
- Because the property was no longer used for public school purposes, the determinable fee ended by operation of law and the property reverted to the grantor’s heirs.
- Judgment was directed to be entered for Peters.

## Legal Principles

- The estate conveyed by deed is governed by the grantor’s intent as expressed in the deed’s language.
- Because the law favors free alienability of land, a deed that otherwise conveys a fee simple is not reduced by unclear or doubtful language; a limiting intent must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied.
- Words such as “as long as” and “so long as,” when tied to a stated use, are technical words of limitation and are commonly used to create a fee simple determinable.
- A deed may create a fee simple determinable even without an express reverter clause; when the limitation is otherwise clear, a possibility of reverter to the grantor is implied.
- Clauses that merely describe a purpose (e.g., “for school purposes only”) may be treated as non-limiting when they lack technical limiting words; the presence of “as long as” materially changes the analysis.

## Conclusion

The Superior Court concluded that the deed’s repeated grant “as long as it is used for public school purposes” limited the school district’s estate to a fee simple determinable, carrying an implied possibility of reverter. Once school use ceased, the district’s title terminated automatically and the land reverted to the grantor’s heirs, so Peters could recover possession in ejectment.


Peters v. East Penn Township School District, 126 A.2d 802 (1956)