## Facts

- David Arthur Peterson, age seven, lived next door to Oliver R. Taylor and B. J. Taylor and frequently played with their child.
- On August 7, 1977, David and his three-year-old sister stopped at the Taylors’ property when no one was home.
- David attempted to build a fire on a concrete slab using twigs and matches he had taken earlier.
- When the fire went out, David opened the Taylors’ storage shed by reaching a sliding bolt positioned about 57 inches from the ground.
- David removed a gasoline can from the shed, opened it, confirmed by smell it was gasoline, and threw a lit match into the can.
- After the flame seemed to die down, David obtained a second gasoline can; gasoline spilled onto his pants, which later ignited, causing severe burns.
- David had not previously entered the shed but knew he was not supposed to be on the Taylors’ property when they were away and was not allowed in the shed.
- David testified he understood gasoline could burn or explode if exposed to a match and had considered the possibility of being burned.
- David’s mother testified she had warned and disciplined him previously for playing with fire.
- An expert described David as of average intelligence with mild hyperactivity and opined he would know playing with gasoline and matches could cause burns, even if he might not appreciate the full extent of the danger.

## Issues

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the seven-year-old plaintiff’s contributory negligence to the jury under the standard of a reasonable child of like age, intelligence, and experience.
2. Whether the jury instructions, considered as a whole, improperly shifted the burden of proving contributory negligence from defendants to plaintiff.
3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing a separate instruction based on Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339 concerning artificial conditions dangerous to trespassing children.
4. Whether the trial court erred in denying a late amendment to add a negligence-per-se theory based on a gasoline-storage statute and whether the alleged statutory noncompliance was a proximate cause of the injury.

## Decision

- The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered on a jury verdict for the defendants.
- The court held the child’s capacity for negligence and the existence of contributory negligence were fact questions appropriately left to the jury under a “like age, intelligence, and experience” standard.
- The court held the instructions did not shift the burden of proof; defendants retained the burden to prove contributory negligence when the charge was read as a whole.
- The court found no reversible error in the refusal to give a separate Restatement § 339 instruction because the instructions given adequately conveyed the relevant negligence standards in the circumstances.
- The court upheld denial of the late amendment asserting negligence per se, reasoning the proposed theory (including the cans’ appearance/labeling) did not establish proximate cause where the child knew the substance was gasoline and intentionally used it with matches.

## Legal Principles

- A child’s negligence and contributory negligence are assessed by the conduct of a reasonable child of like age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances.
- A child’s capacity for negligence is generally a question for the jury; categorical age-based presumptions are disfavored.
- Expert testimony about a child’s characteristics may inform, but does not control, the jury’s determination of negligence under the applicable standard of care.
- Jury instructions are evaluated as a whole; isolated wording will not warrant reversal if the overall charge correctly states the burden of proof and governing law.
- Liability based on statutory violation requires a showing that the violation proximately caused the injury; technical noncompliance without causal connection does not establish liability.
- A trial court may deny a late amendment adding a new theory where it would be improper at that stage and where the proposed allegations do not support proximate causation.

## Conclusion

The court upheld a defense verdict, holding that the seven-year-old’s contributory negligence was properly submitted to the jury under a like-age standard, that the instructions correctly allocated the burden of proof, and that the plaintiff failed to show reversible error regarding a trespassing-children theory or a late-added negligence-per-se claim lacking proximate cause.


Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1982)