## Facts

- Jeanne C. Skeen operated a properly licensed and supervised babysitting/child-care service in her home from 1981 through fall 1991.
- After their prior home was purchased and demolished to make way for a shopping center, Jeanne Skeen and her husband, G. Samuel Skeen, bought a residence on Ridgecrest Road in the City of Bluefield, West Virginia.
- The Ridgecrest Road property was located in an R-1 residence zoning district.
- Bluefield’s zoning ordinance generally barred “business” uses in an R-1 district unless the property owner obtained permission from the City’s Zoning Board of Adjustment.
- The ordinance also listed certain “special exceptions” that could be allowed in an R-1 district, including a “home occupation,” if specific ordinance conditions were met.
- At the suggestion of a city official, the Skeens sought permission to continue Jeanne Skeen’s babysitting service in the new home as a home occupation by applying for a special-exception permit on November 21, 1991; the application was refused that day.
- The Skeens appealed to the Zoning Board of Adjustment, which conducted a noticed public hearing on January 27, 1992 after notice to adjoining landowners and other interested persons.
- Neighbors objected, raising concerns such as traffic, noise, and consistency with the residential character of the neighborhood.
- The Board denied the special-exception permit, even though the Skeens’ proposed use complied with the ordinance’s stated requirements for a home occupation.
- The Skeens sought certiorari review in the Circuit Court of Mercer County, which affirmed the Board’s denial by order entered November 9, 1992.
- The Skeens appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

## Issues

1. Whether a babysitting/child-care service that satisfies the zoning ordinance’s “home occupation” requirements qualifies for a special exception in an R-1 residence district.
2. Whether the Zoning Board of Adjustment may deny a special-exception (conditional use) permit for a qualifying home occupation based on generalized neighborhood opposition rather than substantial evidence that the use would harm the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the circuit court’s order that had affirmed the Board’s denial.
- The Court treated the ordinance’s “special exception” for a home occupation as a legislatively authorized conditional use, not a variance.
- Because the Skeens’ proposed babysitting service met the ordinance’s home-occupation conditions, the Board could not deny the permit absent substantial evidence that the use would adversely affect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
- The Court held that generalized neighbor objections and speculative fears, without record evidence tied to the ordinance’s standards, were not enough to support denial.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion.

## Legal Principles

- A “special exception” in zoning is generally synonymous with a “conditional use”: it is a use the legislative body has already authorized for the district, subject to stated conditions in the ordinance.
- When an applicant shows compliance with the ordinance’s express conditions for a special-exception/conditional-use permit, the zoning board’s discretion is limited; the permit must be granted unless substantial evidence shows the use would harm the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare under applicable standards.
- A zoning board may not treat a special exception like an ad hoc policy decision or deny it based primarily on generalized neighborhood opposition or speculative concerns that are not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
- On certiorari review of a board of adjustment decision, courts defer to supported factual findings but reverse decisions that rest on legal error, arbitrary action, or a lack of substantial evidence connected to the ordinance’s criteria.

## Conclusion

In *Petition of Skeen*, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a licensed in-home babysitting service that met all ordinance requirements for a “home occupation” was entitled to a special-exception (conditional use) permit in an R-1 district, and that the zoning board’s denial—based on generalized objections rather than substantial evidence of harm under the ordinance—was reversible.


Petition of Skeen, 190 W. Va 649, 441 S.E.2d 370 (1994)