## Facts

- Francis E. Getty executed a will in 1932 and died in 1944.
- The will made pecuniary gifts of $2,500 to his widow, Ada C. Getty, and $5,000 to each of his two sons.
- The residue was placed in a testamentary trust directing the trustee to pay trust income to Ada for life, with principal at her death to Getty’s then-living issue (or, if none, to his heirs at law).
- The will granted the trustee broad management and investment discretion but did not expressly authorize or forbid distributions of principal to Ada.
- Ada’s health deteriorated and trust income declined, making income insufficient to cover her living and medical expenses.
- The trustee petitioned for authority to invade principal to provide for Ada’s support and care; all remaindermen consented.

## Issues

1. Whether a court may authorize a trustee to deviate from an income-only trust direction by invading principal to support a life beneficiary when income becomes inadequate.
2. Whether the settlor’s dominant intent, as inferred from the will and circumstances, permits equitable deviation despite the instrument’s silence on principal invasion.

## Decision

- The New Hampshire Supreme Court granted the trustee’s petition.
- The court authorized invasion of trust principal to the extent reasonably necessary to provide Ada’s support and medical care.
- The court treated the settlor’s intent to provide reasonable support for his widow as paramount, with remainder preservation as secondary.

## Legal Principles

- A trust is construed to effectuate the settlor’s dominant intent as shown by the instrument and its overall dispositive plan.
- When supervening circumstances make strict compliance with trust terms frustrate the settlor’s primary purpose, a court of equity may authorize deviation in administration, including use of principal.
- Silence in the instrument regarding principal invasion is not necessarily a prohibition when refusal to invade would defeat the trust’s primary support purpose.
- Consent of remaindermen may support the reasonableness of the requested deviation, though equitable authority to deviate does not depend on consent.

## Conclusion

The court permitted equitable deviation from an income-only support trust by authorizing principal invasion for the widow’s reasonable maintenance and care, because changed conditions made income inadequate and the settlor’s primary purpose was her support.


Petition of Wolcott, 56 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1948)