## Facts

- In January 1959, thawing weather and rain swelled the Buffalo River and sent large ice downstream.
- The *MacGilvray Shiras* (Shiras), owned by Kinsman Transit Co. (Kinsman), was laid up for the winter and moored at a dock operated by Continental Grain Company (Continental), about three miles upstream from the Michigan Avenue drawbridge in Buffalo (City).
- The Shiras was not moored securely for the conditions; ice and current forces built up against the ship and its moorings.
- The pressure dislodged the Shiras, which broke free and drifted downriver.
- At about 10:43 p.m., the Coast Guard notified the bridge that the Shiras was adrift.
- Around 11:00 p.m., the Shiras struck the *Michael K. Tewksbury* (Tewksbury), owned by Midland Steamship Line, Inc. (Midland), knocking the Tewksbury from its moorings.
- After breaking loose, the Tewksbury struck the *Druckenmiller* and continued downstream toward the bridge.
- At about 11:08 p.m., a watchman called the bridge and requested that it be raised; raising the span required about two minutes.
- At about 11:17 p.m., the Tewksbury struck the bridge as it was being raised, wrecking the bridge and injuring two bridge employees.
- The Tewksbury and the Shiras grounded in the wreckage, blocking the river like a dam.
- The blockage caused significant upstream flooding and property damage.
- Numerous claims followed. The vessel owners filed admiralty petitions seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability, and the actions were consolidated in federal district court. The district court allocated fault and held Kinsman, Continental, and the City jointly and severally liable for certain damages, including flooding-related damages, and appeals were taken.

## Issues

1. Whether Kinsman and Continental were negligent in the manner the Shiras was moored, and whether that negligence caused the ensuing collisions.
2. Whether the City was negligent in failing to raise the Michigan Avenue Bridge after receiving warnings of the drifting vessels.
3. Whether the upstream flooding and other widespread property damage were too remote to be treated as legally caused by the defendants’ negligence.
4. Whether Midland was at fault for the Tewksbury’s role in the bridge collision and resulting losses.
5. Whether Kinsman (and/or Midland) was entitled to exoneration or limitation of liability under the Limitation of Liability Act.

## Decision

- The court held Kinsman and Continental negligent for failing to secure the Shiras against the known risks posed by the river conditions, and held that negligence a cause of the downstream collisions.
- The court held the City negligent for failing to raise the bridge in time after receiving warning and having time to act.
- The court rejected the argument that flooding and related physical property damage were too remote; once the defendants’ negligence created a foreseeable risk of physical harm from a drifting ship, liability was not cut off merely because the damage occurred through an unusual sequence or on a large scale.
- The court treated the City’s failure to open the bridge as a concurrent cause, not a superseding cause that relieved earlier wrongdoers of liability.
- The court found Midland not at fault for the events after the Tewksbury was set adrift.
- On the limitation petitions, the court denied exoneration to Kinsman but addressed limitation under the statute in light of whether the fault was within Kinsman’s privity or knowledge, while Midland’s lack of fault made its exoneration effective as to liability.

## Legal Principles

- Proximate cause is satisfied where the harm is of the same general type as the risk that made the conduct negligent, even if the exact manner, sequence, or extent of the damage was not expected.
- Intervening negligence by another actor (such as failing to prevent a threatened collision) does not automatically break the causal chain; it commonly remains a concurrent cause when it falls within the range of risks created by the original negligence.
- Where negligent conduct leads to physical damage to property, recovery is not barred solely because many parties are harmed or because the losses are large, so long as the harm is connected to the risk created.
- A municipality operating a drawbridge may be liable for negligent operation when it fails to act with reasonable care after receiving timely warning of an approaching hazard.
- Under the Limitation of Liability Act, a vessel owner seeking limitation must show the negligent condition was not within its privity or knowledge; exoneration requires absence of fault.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit upheld liability for negligent mooring and negligent bridge operation and permitted recovery for the resulting collisions, personal injuries, and upstream flood damage, reasoning that the damages flowed from the same general risk created by setting a ship adrift and failing to timely open the bridge, even though the resulting chain of events and scale of harm were unusual.


Petitions of the Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (1964)