## Facts

- Philip Crosby Associates, Inc. operated a management-consulting business offering quality-improvement seminars through a division called “Quality College.”
- The seminars were held in rented classrooms and similar facilities across Florida and were marketed as professional or corporate training.
- The programs did not confer postsecondary degrees or diplomas and did not offer transferable “college credit.”
- The State Board of Independent Colleges and Universities informed Crosby that Florida law required Board approval to use “college” or “university.”
- In an administrative proceeding, the Board determined Crosby did not need licensure because it was not a degree- or credit-granting institution.
- Despite finding no licensure requirement, the Board issued a final order directing Crosby not to use the word “college” in connection with its activities.
- Crosby sought judicial review of the final administrative order.

## Issues

1. Whether Florida Statutes § 246.121 authorized the Board to prohibit a non-degree-granting, noncredit training provider from using the word “college” in its name and advertising.
2. Whether the Board exceeded its statutory jurisdiction by imposing a name restriction after finding Crosby outside the licensure scheme.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the determination that Crosby was not required to be licensed under the statute.
- The court reversed the portion of the final order prohibiting Crosby from using the word “college.”
- The case was remanded for action consistent with the court’s statutory interpretation, effectively nullifying the name restriction.

## Legal Principles

- An administrative agency has only those powers expressly granted by statute or necessarily implied to carry out the statutory scheme.
- Statutory restrictions tied to an agency’s regulatory program cannot be applied as a stand-alone control over entities the agency lacks jurisdiction to license or regulate.
- A regulatory board may not extend authority by treating word usage alone as a basis to regulate an otherwise nonregulated entity.

## Conclusion

The court held that, because Crosby’s training programs neither awarded degrees nor provided college credit, the Board lacked statutory authority under § 246.121 to forbid Crosby from using “college” to describe its program, even though the Board could regulate degree-granting institutions within its licensing jurisdiction.


Philip Crosby Assocs., Inc. v. State Bd. of Indep. Colls. & Univs., 506 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)