## Facts

- Jesse D. Williams, a long-time Marlboro smoker, died of lung cancer; his estate sued Philip Morris in Oregon state court for negligence and deceit.
- The jury found Williams’s death was caused by smoking and that he smoked in part because he believed smoking was safe.
- The jury found Philip Morris knowingly made false representations leading Williams to believe smoking was safe.
- The jury awarded about $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages on the deceit claim.
- The trial court reduced the punitive award; the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the full $79.5 million; the Oregon Supreme Court upheld it.
- Philip Morris requested a jury instruction barring punishment for harm to persons not before the court; the trial judge refused, and Oregon appellate courts found no due process violation.

## Issues

1. Whether the Due Process Clause permits a jury to base punitive damages, in part, on a desire to punish a defendant for harming persons who are not parties to the litigation.
2. Whether due process required a limiting instruction preventing the jury from punishing Philip Morris for harm to nonparties.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment and remanded, in a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Breyer.
- The Court held that the Due Process Clause forbids a state from using punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries inflicted on nonparties.
- The Court concluded that Oregon’s refusal to give a limiting instruction created an unreasonable risk that the jury punished Philip Morris for harm to nonparties.
- The Court did not decide whether the punitive award was “grossly excessive” under substantive due process precedents; it confined its ruling to the nonparty-punishment question.

## Legal Principles

- Punitive damages may further legitimate state interests in punishment and deterrence, but the Due Process Clause imposes constitutional limits on the procedures used to award them.
- A jury may consider evidence that the defendant’s conduct harmed others to assess reprehensibility, but it may not punish the defendant for injuries to persons not before the court.
- Punishing for nonparty harm violates due process because the defendant lacks an opportunity to litigate individualized defenses and circumstances related to those nonparties’ alleged injuries.
- Allowing punishment for undefined nonparty injuries introduces a standardless and unpredictable component that heightens risks of arbitrary penalties and inadequate notice.
- When evidence or argument about harm to others is presented, states must use safeguards—such as appropriate jury instructions—to reduce the risk that punitive damages serve as punishment for nonparty harm.

## Conclusion

The Court held that procedural due process prohibits punitive damages designed to punish for harm to nonparties, while permitting consideration of broader harm only to measure reprehensibility, and required adequate safeguards such as limiting instructions to prevent juries from crossing that line.


Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007)