## Facts

- Homer Pingley (plaintiff) owned and operated a restaurant in Mullins, South Carolina.
- Carl Brunson (defendant) was “an automobile repairman by trade” who also played the organ part-time for various establishments in the Mullins area.
- On December 6, 1977, Pingley and Brunson executed a written contract under which Brunson agreed to play the organ at Pingley’s restaurant for three years.
- The contract required Brunson to play three designated nights each week and an additional night during certain specified months.
- Pingley agreed to pay Brunson $50 per night.
- The contract also provided that Pingley was purchasing musical instruments for Brunson’s use at the restaurant at a price of $4,262.96, to be paid through monthly deductions from Brunson’s paychecks.
- After full payment, the instruments would become Brunson’s property; if Brunson breached the contract, he would forfeit any claim to the instruments.
- Brunson began performing on the night the contract was signed (December 6, 1977) and played for nine evenings thereafter.
- Brunson did not appear for his scheduled performance on December 27, 1977, and thereafter failed and refused to perform under the contract.
- Pingley sued in equity seeking specific performance of the contract and an injunction preventing Brunson from playing for other establishments during times that would conflict with the contract.
- Evidence showed Brunson was an excellent musician who could attract customers, but five other musicians of comparable talent were available for hire in the Mullins area.
- The trial court ordered Brunson to perform under the contract and enjoined him from playing elsewhere during conflicting times; Brunson appealed.

## Issues

1. May a court of equity decree specific performance of a three-year contract requiring continuous personal services as a restaurant musician?
2. Was it proper to enjoin the musician from playing for other establishments during times that would conflict with the contracted performance schedule?

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the trial court’s order.
- The court held that specific performance was not a proper remedy to enforce this long-term personal services contract calling for continuous performance over an extended period.
- Although equity may grant specific performance in limited circumstances when services have a unique and peculiar value, the record did not support treating Brunson’s services as so unique that legal remedies were inadequate, given the availability of comparable musicians.
- The injunction restraining Brunson from playing elsewhere during conflicting times was also improper in these circumstances because it functioned as an indirect way to compel continued performance of personal services.
- Pingley’s remedy, if any, lay at law (such as damages), not in coercive equitable relief.

## Legal Principles

- Equity ordinarily will not order specific performance of contracts for personal services, especially when the promised performance would be continuous over a long period.
- Specific performance for personal services may be considered only in limited situations where the services have a “unique and peculiar” value and damages are not an adequate remedy.
- Evidence that comparable performers are available supports the conclusion that damages are adequate and that the “unique and peculiar” exception does not apply.
- Courts are reluctant to issue injunctions that, in practical effect, compel ongoing personal service performance by restricting a defendant’s ability to work elsewhere during the contract term.

## Conclusion

Because the contract required extended, ongoing personal services and Brunson’s musical performance was not shown to be so unique that damages were inadequate—particularly where comparable musicians were available—the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed the decree ordering Brunson to perform and the related injunction, leaving Pingley to pursue legal remedies rather than specific performance or similar equitable compulsion.


Pingley v. Brunson, 272 S.C. 421, 252 S.E.2d 560 (1979)