## Facts

- Scott Lynn Pinholster was convicted in California of two first-degree murders with special circumstances (robbery and burglary) arising from a planned burglary that escalated into fatal violence when two men confronted the intruders.
- A jury imposed the death penalty.
- At the penalty phase, defense counsel conducted virtually no mitigation investigation and acknowledged being unprepared for the prosecution’s aggravating evidence.
- Counsel declined a continuance, waived opening statement, presented no medical, psychiatric, or expert mitigation evidence, and called a single lay witness whose testimony was brief and harmful.
- Mitigation developed later included evidence of organic brain damage, possible seizures, significant childhood abuse and deprivation, chronic substance abuse, and longstanding mental illness.
- The California Supreme Court summarily denied state habeas relief, including ineffective-assistance claims.
- In federal habeas proceedings, the district court denied guilt-phase relief but granted relief as to the death sentence; a Ninth Circuit panel reversed the penalty-phase grant; the en banc court reheard the case.

## Issues

1. Whether the state court’s rejection of Pinholster’s guilt-phase ineffective-assistance claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2. Whether the state court’s rejection of Pinholster’s penalty-phase ineffective-assistance claim was an unreasonable application of *Strickland v. Washington* under AEDPA, in light of counsel’s mitigation investigation and presentation.

## Decision

- The en banc Ninth Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief as to the conviction.
- The court affirmed the grant of habeas relief as to the death sentence and ordered a new penalty phase.
- On the guilt phase, the court held the state court’s application of *Strickland* was not objectively unreasonable and any asserted deficiencies did not establish prejudice given the evidence of guilt.
- On the penalty phase, the court held the state court unreasonably applied *Strickland* because counsel’s mitigation performance was both deficient and prejudicial, even under AEDPA deference.
- The court evaluated unreasonableness by considering the record before the state court and mitigation evidence developed in federal court.

## Legal Principles

- Under *Strickland v. Washington*, ineffective assistance requires (1) deficient performance measured against objective reasonableness and (2) prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
- In capital sentencing, reasonable performance includes a meaningful investigation into the defendant’s background and mental health for mitigating evidence; uninformed choices are not protected as “strategy.”
- Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is available only if the state court’s adjudication was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or rested on an unreasonable factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
- A state court decision can be “unreasonable” under AEDPA when counsel’s mitigation failures are extreme and omitted mitigation is substantial enough to undermine confidence in the death verdict.

## Conclusion

The en banc court left the convictions intact but set aside the death sentence, concluding that trial counsel’s near-total failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase created a reasonable probability of a life verdict and rendered the state court’s contrary *Strickland* determination unreasonable under AEDPA.


Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)