Facts
- Kenneth Pledger worked for Halliburton Energy Services as part of a three-man crew performing offshore work and was covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).
- After the crew finished its assigned job, Phil Guilbeau Offshore, Inc. asked the crew to perform additional work involving handling equipment on one of Offshore’s vessels.
- A crane and personnel lift basket were used to transfer the crew to Offshore’s vessel.
- When the crew stepped onto the vessel, they saw the deck was slippery and covered with algae.
- The crew talked among themselves about the algae condition and decided they could still perform the work safely despite the slippery deck.
- During the work, Pledger slipped on the algae-covered deck, fell near an area where cargo was being handled, and was injured.
- Because Pledger was an LHWCA-covered worker, he sued for vessel negligence under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Offshore (and related defendants named in the suit, including Stone Energy Corporation and Aries Marine Corporation) moved for summary judgment.
Issues
- Whether Offshore, as vessel owner/operator, breached the LHWCA § 905(b) vessel duties recognized in Scindia by turning over a deck condition (algae) that was open and obvious to the contractor’s crew.
- Whether Offshore retained and exercised enough control over the work area or the manner of the operation to trigger and breach the Scindia active-control duty.
- Whether Offshore had a duty to intervene after the contractor’s crew recognized the algae hazard and chose to proceed.
- Whether Stone Energy Corporation or Aries Marine Corporation owed any maritime negligence duty tied to knowledge of, or control over, the algae condition or the operation.
Decision
- The court granted summary judgment for Phil Guilbeau Offshore, Inc. and dismissed Pledger’s § 905(b) claim against it.
- The court concluded the algae condition was open and obvious and was recognized by the Halliburton crew before work began; this defeated a turnover-duty theory premised on failure to warn or correct.
- The court found no basis for active-control liability because the vessel did not control the methods and means of the Halliburton crew’s work; at most, vessel personnel gave general directions about cargo placement.
- The court held the duty to intervene was not triggered because the contractor’s crew had actual awareness of the condition and chose to proceed; the record did not show the vessel had the required knowledge that the contractor’s continued operations were so clearly unreasonable that the vessel had to stop the work.
- The court also granted summary judgment for Stone Energy Corporation and Aries Marine Corporation, finding no showing of the kind of knowledge, involvement, or control that would create liability for Pledger’s algae-related injury.
Legal Principles
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Under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), an LHWCA-covered worker may sue a “vessel” for negligence, but the vessel’s duties are limited by Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos.
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The Scindia duties generally include:
- Turnover duty: deliver the vessel and its equipment in reasonably safe condition for the contractor’s work and warn of hidden hazards known to the vessel that are not obvious to, or anticipated by, the contractor.
- Active-control duty: exercise reasonable care in areas or operations over which the vessel retains active control.
- Duty to intervene: in limited settings, act when the vessel has actual knowledge of a dangerous condition and actual knowledge that the contractor is continuing in the face of that danger in a plainly unreasonable manner.
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An open and obvious deck condition known to the contractor’s workers generally does not support vessel liability under the turnover duty.
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General vessel involvement, such as giving placement instructions for cargo, does not alone establish active control over the contractor’s methods and means.
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The duty to intervene is narrow; awareness of a hazard, without the additional showing that the vessel knew the contractor was acting in a clearly unreasonable way, is not enough.
Conclusion
The court entered summary judgment for the defendants because the algae-slick deck was apparent and known to the contractor’s crew, the vessel did not control how the crew performed the work, and the record did not support a narrow duty-to-intervene theory under Scindia; the non-vessel defendants likewise lacked the necessary knowledge or operational involvement to support maritime negligence liability for the algae-related injury.