## Facts

- Sharon B. Pollard, a DuPont employee, brought a Title VII action alleging a sex-based hostile work environment.
- The district court found Pollard was subjected to co-worker sexual harassment known to supervisors, resulting in psychological treatment, medical leave, and eventual dismissal after she refused to return to the hostile workplace.
- The court awarded Pollard back pay and benefits ($107,364), attorney’s fees ($252,997), and compensatory damages ($300,000), reflecting the statutory maximum under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
- The district court concluded the compensatory award did not fully compensate Pollard but treated any front pay as subject to the same § 1981a(b)(3) cap under controlling circuit precedent.
- Front pay was understood as compensation for lost wages and benefits after judgment until reinstatement, or awarded instead of reinstatement when reinstatement is not feasible.

## Issues

1. Whether front pay constitutes “compensatory damages” under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, making it subject to the statutory cap in § 1981a(b)(3).
2. Whether front pay is instead equitable relief authorized by Title VII’s remedial provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (§ 706(g)), and therefore outside § 1981a’s damages cap.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit and remanded.
- The Court held that front pay is not an element of compensatory damages under § 1981a and is not subject to the § 1981a(b)(3) cap.
- The Court treated front pay as equitable relief available under § 706(g), either to bridge the period until reinstatement or as a substitute when reinstatement is impracticable.
- Justice O’Connor did not participate.

## Legal Principles

- Title VII § 706(g) authorizes equitable relief to remedy intentional discrimination, including reinstatement, back pay, and “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”
- Front pay is equitable relief under § 706(g) when used to cover post-judgment losses until reinstatement or when awarded in lieu of reinstatement.
- Section 1981a’s compensatory and punitive damages are “in addition to” the relief available under § 706(g), and § 1981a(b)(2) excludes from “compensatory damages” back pay, interest on back pay, and other § 706(g) relief.
- The § 1981a(b)(3) damages cap applies to statutory compensatory damages under § 1981a, not to equitable monetary relief awarded under § 706(g), including front pay.

## Conclusion

Front pay in Title VII intentional discrimination cases is an equitable remedy under § 706(g), not compensatory damages under § 1981a, so it is not limited by § 1981a(b)(3)’s statutory cap and may be awarded alongside capped compensatory damages and other Title VII relief.


Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001)