## Facts

- Thomas E. Pollard pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota to unlawfully taking and embezzling a U.S. Treasury check.
- The district judge deferred imposition of sentence for a presentence investigation.
- At a later appearance while Pollard was serving a Minnesota state sentence, the judge addressed Pollard’s rehabilitation efforts and ended the proceeding without clearly pronouncing a sentence in Pollard’s presence.
- After Pollard left the courtroom, the judge responded to a prosecutor’s questions and stated that Pollard would be on probation for three years beginning after completion of the state sentence.
- A judgment and order of probation was entered suspending imposition of sentence and placing Pollard on probation; the Government later conceded this order was invalid because Pollard was absent when it was imposed.
- About two years later, after Pollard was arrested for an alleged probation violation, the district court set aside the earlier probation order and entered a formal judgment sentencing Pollard to two years’ imprisonment.
- Pollard sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the 1954 sentence; the district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied leave to appeal.
- After certiorari was granted, Pollard was released from federal custody, but the Supreme Court proceeded to decide the case.

## Issues

1. Whether Pollard’s release from custody mooted his challenge to the sentence.
2. Whether the Court could consider challenges to the 1954 sentence raised for the first time in Pollard’s Supreme Court briefing.
3. Whether imposing the 1954 sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause given the earlier (invalid) probation order.
4. Whether the delay between the guilty plea and the 1954 sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)’s requirement that sentence be imposed without unreasonable delay.
5. Whether additional claimed defects in the 1954 sentencing proceeding warranted § 2255 relief.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of § 2255 relief.
- The case was not moot because collateral consequences from a sentence may persist after release.
- The Court considered the legality of the 1954 sentence despite imperfect preservation, in light of Pollard’s lack of counsel in earlier stages.
- The 1954 sentence did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the earlier probation order was conceded invalid due to Pollard’s absence.
- The delay in sentencing did not violate the Sixth Amendment or Rule 32(a).
- Other asserted sentencing-procedure errors were not properly presented and were unsupported by the record.
- Because Pollard lost on the merits, the Court did not decide whether the court of appeals properly denied leave to appeal.

## Legal Principles

- A criminal sentencing challenge is not necessarily moot after release when collateral legal consequences may continue.
- The Court may, in limited circumstances, consider legal challenges first developed in the Supreme Court where strict preservation rules would be inequitable.
- An invalid sentencing or probation order entered when the defendant is not present does not create a double-jeopardy bar to later imposition of a lawful sentence on the same conviction.
- Sixth Amendment speedy-trial principles and Rule 32(a)’s “without unreasonable delay” requirement apply to sentencing, but delay is assessed for reasonableness and prejudice in context rather than by a rigid time measure.
- Claims of sentencing-procedure error must be properly raised and supported by the record to justify collateral relief under § 2255.

## Conclusion

The Court held that Pollard’s completed custody did not moot his sentencing challenge, and it upheld a later valid sentence imposed after an earlier, invalid probation order entered in his absence, finding no double-jeopardy violation and no unconstitutional or rule-based unreasonable delay in sentencing.


Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957)