## Facts

- Members of a federally recognized tribe challenged actions by the tribe’s traditional governing officials amid an internal political dispute.
- Petitioners criticized tribal leadership for alleged misconduct and formed an opposing “Interim General Council.”
- Tribal officials treated petitioners’ political activity as “treason,” summarily “convicted” them, and issued written orders of permanent banishment from the reservation.
- The orders directed petitioners to leave immediately and never return; removed them from tribal rolls; stripped their Indian names and tribal citizenship; transferred responsibility for their lands to the governing council; and declared a permanent loss of rights and benefits afforded to members.
- Tribal officials notified federal and state authorities of the “convictions” and requested recognition and assistance in removing petitioners; federal officials publicly recognized the traditional council as the tribe’s legal governing body.
- Petitioners alleged continuing efforts to enforce the banishment, including attempts to physically eject them, harassment and assaults, and denial of services such as electrical service.
- Petitioners filed federal habeas petitions under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), asserting that the banishment functioned as criminal punishment imposed without ICRA-required protections.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that permanent banishment did not amount to “detention” or “custody” under ICRA’s habeas provision.

## Issues

1. Whether permanent banishment from a reservation, stripping of tribal citizenship and rights, and ongoing enforcement efforts constitute “detention” or “custody” under 25 U.S.C. § 1303.
2. Whether federal courts therefore have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions challenging such tribal action as violating ICRA.

## Decision

- The court of appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded.
- Permanent banishment coupled with the loss of tribal citizenship and attendant rights, and accompanied by ongoing enforcement efforts, imposed a severe, present restraint on liberty sufficient to satisfy § 1303’s “detention” requirement.
- Because the “in custody” threshold was met, federal habeas jurisdiction existed to consider petitioners’ ICRA claims on the merits.

## Legal Principles

- “Detention” in ICRA § 1303 is informed by federal habeas “custody” doctrine and is not limited to physical imprisonment; it includes significant restraints on liberty.
- Permanent tribal banishment, especially when accompanied by formal loss of tribal citizenship and rights and real efforts to enforce removal, can qualify as “custody” for § 1303 purposes.
- ICRA provides limited federal enforcement primarily through habeas; an unduly narrow reading of “detention” would foreclose federal review of severe tribal sanctions that function as punishment.
- Recognizing § 1303 jurisdiction for extreme restraints does not create general federal supervision of tribal governance; it permits a confined inquiry into compliance with ICRA where a qualifying restraint exists.

## Conclusion

The court held that permanent banishment orders stripping tribal citizenship and rights, together with ongoing enforcement measures, can place individuals “in custody” under ICRA’s habeas provision, allowing federal courts to hear challenges alleging ICRA violations.


Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996)