## Facts

- Randolph Porter was born in St. Vincent and the Grenadines; his mother, Mary Diamond, was born in Brooklyn, New York, and later moved to St. Vincent.
- Porter was a naturalized U.S. citizen but sought a declaration that he had been a U.S. citizen from birth through derivative citizenship based on his mother’s citizenship and required U.S. physical presence before his birth.
- Porter’s claim depended on proving that Diamond remained physically present in the United States for more than one year after her birth before relocating abroad.
- Porter lacked contemporaneous documents showing Diamond’s length of U.S. residence and instead submitted affidavits from Diamond and others stating (based on memory and family “common knowledge”) that she moved to St. Vincent when she was between one and two years old, or about one and a half.
- Porter pursued relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (declaration of nationality) and sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a).
- The district court excluded the affidavits as inadmissible hearsay, rejected reliance on Federal Rules of Evidence 803(19) and 804(b)(4), and granted summary judgment for USCIS and the district director.
- Porter appealed, arguing the evidentiary exclusion was an abuse of discretion and that the remaining record sufficed to defeat summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding affidavits concerning Diamond’s age at relocation and family reputation about that fact as hearsay not within Federal Rules of Evidence 803(19) or 804(b)(4).
2. Whether, without those affidavits, Porter produced sufficient admissible evidence to establish derivative citizenship under the applicable physical-presence requirement and thereby obtain declaratory relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed.
- The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the affidavits as inadmissible hearsay and in declining to apply Rules 803(19) and 804(b)(4) to the proffered statements.
- The court held that summary judgment evidence must be admissible, and that, once the affidavits were excluded, Porter lacked sufficient admissible proof of Diamond’s required period of U.S. physical presence.
- Because Porter bore the burden to prove citizenship in a § 1503(a) action, the absence of admissible evidence on an essential statutory element warranted judgment for the government.

## Legal Principles

- In ruling on summary judgment, courts consider only admissible evidence; inadmissible hearsay cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact.
- In an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) seeking a declaration of U.S. nationality, the claimant bears the burden of establishing citizenship under the applicable statutory criteria.
- Federal Rules of Evidence 803(19) (family reputation concerning personal or family history) and 804(b)(4) (statements of personal or family history by an unavailable declarant) are applied within the trial court’s discretion; exclusion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- A district court does not abuse its discretion where it reasonably determines that post hoc family statements offered to prove a precise, outcome-determinative fact do not fit within the asserted family-history hearsay exceptions.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit upheld the exclusion of family affidavits offered to prove the citizen parent’s period of U.S. physical presence and affirmed summary judgment because the claimant, bearing the burden in a § 1503(a) nationality action, lacked admissible evidence to establish derivative citizenship.


Porter v. Quarantillo, 722 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013)