## Facts

- On February 16, 1997, Phaly Poy was involved in a confrontation at a Lowell, Massachusetts nightclub where Officer John Boutselis, a Lowell police officer, was working private security.
- After a doorman blocked Poy from entering a room, Boutselis told Poy to leave; Poy testified that as he turned to comply, Boutselis pushed him to the floor, sat on him, and repeatedly struck his head using handcuffs as a weapon.
- Poy was handcuffed in an unusual manner, taken to the police station, and later transported for emergency treatment of a laceration above his right eye requiring stitches; he reported continuing pain and functional difficulties for weeks afterward.
- Poy was criminally charged (including resisting arrest and assault and battery on a police officer) but was later acquitted by a state jury.
- On February 16, 2000, exactly three years after the incident, Poy filed a federal civil action asserting § 1983 claims (including excessive force and false arrest) and related Massachusetts tort claims against Boutselis and other defendants.
- After a seven-day jury trial, the jury found Boutselis individually liable for excessive force, false arrest, and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, awarding $10,000 compensatory damages, $25,000 punitive damages, and prejudgment interest; other claims and defendants were dismissed.
- The district court denied Boutselis’s new-trial motion and denied attorney’s fees to both sides, including denying Poy fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

## Issues

1. Whether Poy’s claims were time-barred under the applicable three-year statute of limitations and federal accrual rules for § 1983 actions.
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Boutselis’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence and alleged excessiveness of damages.
3. Whether a prevailing defendant (Officer Conroy) was entitled to attorney’s fees under § 1988.
4. Whether Poy was a “prevailing party” under § 1988 and whether the district court could deny all attorney’s fees and costs based on partial success and fee-application defects.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the rejection of Boutselis’s statute of limitations defense; the complaint filed on the three-year anniversary was timely under the applicable limitations period and accrual principles.
- The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, holding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages did not warrant appellate intervention.
- The court affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to Conroy, concluding the claims against him were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
- The court vacated the orders denying Poy attorney’s fees and costs and remanded for determination of an appropriate award.

## Legal Principles

- In Massachusetts, § 1983 actions borrow the state personal-injury limitations period (three years), and accrual is governed by federal law: a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury.
- A district court’s denial of a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion; credibility determinations and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict are for the jury, and damages are disturbed only in extreme circumstances.
- Prevailing defendants may recover § 1988 fees only when the plaintiff’s claims are frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.
- A plaintiff who obtains actual relief on the merits that materially alters the parties’ legal relationship is a prevailing party under § 1988, even if the plaintiff loses some claims or against some defendants.
- Once prevailing-party status is established, the proper approach is to calculate a reasonable fee (lodestar) and make justified reductions for limited success, unrelated unsuccessful work, or inadequate documentation; an across-the-board denial of all fees is generally improper.

## Conclusion

The First Circuit upheld the jury’s findings and damages against the officer for excessive force and false arrest and rejected limitations and new-trial challenges, but held the plaintiff plainly prevailed for § 1988 purposes and was entitled to consideration of a reasonable fee award, requiring vacatur of the blanket fee denial and remand for recalculation.


Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479 (1st Cir. 2003)