## Facts

- PPG Industries, a U.S. float-glass producer, sought countervailing duties on unprocessed float glass imported from Mexico for January 1–September 30, 1983.
- Countervailing duties under 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) apply when a foreign country bestows a “bounty or grant” on manufacture, production, or export of imported goods.
- After 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) defined “subsidy” with a “specific domestic subsidy” concept; Commerce interpreted § 1303(a) consistently, countervailing only subsidies provided to a specific enterprise/industry or group.
- PPG alleged two Mexican programs conferred countervailable benefits:
  - FICORCA, a foreign-exchange risk coverage program for certain firms with foreign-currency debt.
  - Industrial natural-gas pricing allegedly below world market levels.
- Commerce determined the Mexican float-glass producers did not use FICORCA during the investigation period.
- Commerce also found the producers paid the same natural-gas price as other industrial users, so any benefit was not specific to float-glass producers.
- The Court of International Trade sustained Commerce’s interpretation and its determination that no countervailable “bounty or grant” was shown.

## Issues

1. Whether Commerce may interpret “bounty or grant” in 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) to cover only subsidies that are specific to an enterprise/industry or group, informed by 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5).
2. Whether substantial evidence supported Commerce’s findings that FICORCA and Mexico’s natural-gas pricing did not confer a countervailable benefit on Mexican float-glass producers.

## Decision

- The Federal Circuit affirmed the Court of International Trade.
- The court held Commerce’s specificity-based interpretation of § 1303(a) was permissible in light of the statutory scheme, including § 1677(5).
- The court rejected PPG’s position that broadly available programs are countervailable whenever an “identifiable” beneficiary group can be described.
- The court upheld Commerce’s finding of no countervailable benefit from FICORCA because the investigated producers did not use the program.
- The court upheld Commerce’s finding that Mexico’s natural-gas pricing was generally applicable to industrial users and did not provide a specific benefit to float-glass producers.

## Legal Principles

- “Bounty or grant” under 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) may be construed to require subsidy specificity to an enterprise/industry or group, consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5).
- Broad, generally applicable economic measures are not countervailable absent a showing that, in operation, benefits are limited to or predominantly used by a specific enterprise/industry or group.
- A party seeking countervailing duties must show the investigated producers actually received a benefit from the challenged program during the relevant period.
- Agency determinations in countervailing duty investigations are sustained when the statutory interpretation is reasonable and factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.

## Conclusion

The Federal Circuit upheld Commerce’s specificity limitation for countervailable subsidies under § 1303(a) and affirmed Commerce’s determination that neither FICORCA nor Mexico’s industrial natural-gas pricing produced a countervailable “bounty or grant” for the Mexican float-glass producers.


PPG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 928 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991)