## Facts

- Mary V. Pratt sued Kelley C. Philbrook in federal court for personal injuries arising from a motor-vehicle accident in which Philbrook’s truck struck the car in which Pratt was a passenger.
- The district court held a settlement conference on January 17, 1996.
- The next day, after a hearing at which counsel reported that the case had settled, the court entered an order dismissing the action. The order allowed the case to be reopened within 60 days, for good cause, if the settlement was not consummated.
- Pratt’s counsel did not notify the court within the 60-day period that final settlement terms had not been completed.
- More than 60 days after dismissal, Pratt’s counsel wrote the court seeking a trial date on the ground that settlement had not been reached; the court treated the request as an effort to reopen and denied it.
- Pratt pursued appellate review. The First Circuit remanded for the district court to consider whether the failure to act within the deadline could be excused under an “excusable neglect” analysis informed by *Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership*.
- On remand, the district court again declined to reopen the dismissed case, and the First Circuit later affirmed that result.
- After the original case remained closed, Pratt filed a new action in the same federal district court against Philbrook, alleging that a binding settlement had been reached at the settlement conference and later repudiated.
- The new complaint asserted six state-law theories tied to the alleged settlement: breach of contract, deceit (fraud), negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit.
- Philbrook moved for summary judgment on all counts.

## Issues

1. Whether Pratt could maintain a new, separate action based on an alleged settlement from the earlier dismissed case after the dismissal became final and the court’s refusal to reopen was affirmed on appeal.
2. Whether the summary-judgment record permitted a finding that the parties formed an enforceable settlement contract under Massachusetts law.
3. Whether Pratt’s tort and quasi-contract theories could proceed in the absence of proof supporting their required elements and in light of the final disposition of the earlier case.

## Decision

- The court allowed Philbrook’s motion for summary judgment on all counts.
- The court treated the new lawsuit as an impermissible effort to obtain relief that, procedurally, should have been pursued (and already was pursued) through timely action in the original case and through the Rule 60(b)/excusable-neglect process reviewed on appeal.
- The court concluded that permitting the second action would effectively nullify the earlier dismissal order and the final rulings declining to reopen the first case.
- Separately, on the merits of the contract-based theory, the court found the record did not establish an enforceable settlement agreement with sufficiently definite, mutually assented-to material terms.
- The court also entered judgment for Philbrook on deceit and negligent misrepresentation because the summary-judgment record did not support the necessary misrepresentation-and-reliance showing.
- The court rejected promissory estoppel for lack of a clear, definite promise and reasonable detrimental reliance adequate to reach a jury.
- The court rejected unjust enrichment and quantum meruit because Pratt did not show a cognizable benefit conferred on Philbrook under circumstances that would make retention inequitable, particularly given the unconsummated, disputed settlement.

## Legal Principles

- A party may not use a second lawsuit to function as a collateral attack on a final dismissal order and later appellate rulings that left the original case closed.
- A conditional dismissal entered after counsel reports settlement is a case-management device; it does not, by itself, prove that an enforceable settlement contract was formed.
- Settlement agreements are enforced according to ordinary contract principles; the proponent must show mutual assent and sufficiently definite material terms.
- Fraud (deceit) and negligent misrepresentation require proof of a false statement of material fact and reasonable detrimental reliance; without evidence supporting those elements, summary judgment is proper.
- Promissory estoppel requires a clear and definite promise and reasonable reliance causing detriment; vague settlement talk or incomplete negotiations are not enough.
- Unjust enrichment and quantum meruit require a benefit conferred and inequitable retention; they cannot be used to recover the value of a settlement that was not proven to have been completed as a binding agreement.

## Conclusion

The district court granted summary judgment for Philbrook, holding that Pratt’s second action—based on an alleged settlement from a prior case dismissed under a 60-day conditional order—could not proceed after the dismissal became final and reopening was denied and affirmed on appeal, and that the record independently failed to show an enforceable settlement or the elements of Pratt’s tort and restitution claims.


Pratt v. Philbrook, 38 F. Supp. 2d 63 (1999)