Facts
- Randy Joseph Moore and two accomplices assaulted Kenneth Rogers, restrained him, put him in a car trunk, drove to a rural area, and Moore fatally shot him.
- After the killing, Moore and an accomplice told Moore’s brother and the accomplice’s girlfriend that the group intended only to scare Rogers and that the shooting was accidental.
- Moore and an accomplice later gave police an account consistent with what they told the two witnesses; Moore’s statement to police was recorded.
- On counsel’s advice, Moore entered a no-contest plea to felony murder in exchange for a 300-month sentence, the statutory minimum for that offense.
- In state postconviction proceedings, Moore argued his lawyer was ineffective for advising the plea without first moving to suppress the recorded police confession.
- Counsel testified he did not file a suppression motion because Moore’s statements to the two civilian witnesses were admissible and would make suppression ineffective as a practical matter; counsel also warned that the pre-shooting abuse could support an aggravated-murder charge exposing Moore to death or life without parole.
Issues
- Whether, on federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in rejecting Moore’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not seeking suppression of the police confession before advising a no-contest plea.
- Whether the state court could reasonably find no Strickland prejudice where the plea secured the minimum felony-murder sentence and the prosecution still had independent, admissible confessions to two witnesses.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held Moore was not entitled to federal habeas relief.
- The Court held the Ninth Circuit failed to give the state court the deference required by AEDPA when evaluating a Strickland claim arising from plea bargaining.
- The Court concluded it was reasonable for the state court to accept counsel’s explanation that a suppression motion would not materially change the case given other admissible confessions.
- The Court further concluded it was reasonable for the state court to find no prejudice because Moore did not show a reasonable probability he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial if counsel had pursued suppression.
- Justice Ginsburg concurred in the judgment; Justice Kagan did not participate.
Legal Principles
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court’s merits decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law; it is not enough that the federal court would decide differently.
- Ineffective-assistance claims are governed by Strickland’s two requirements: deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
- When Strickland is reviewed through AEDPA, the analysis is highly deferential to counsel’s judgments and to the state court’s resolution; relief is unavailable absent an application of Strickland beyond the range of fairminded disagreement.
- In the plea context, prejudice generally requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged error, the defendant would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial.
- Counsel’s choice not to litigate suppression before advising a plea may be reasonable where other strong admissible evidence remains and the plea secures a substantially lower sentencing exposure than likely alternatives.
Conclusion
The Court held that, given AEDPA’s limits on federal habeas review, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in concluding that counsel’s failure to seek suppression of Moore’s police confession before advising a no-contest plea was neither constitutionally deficient nor shown to be prejudicial in light of independent admissible confessions and the favorable minimum-sentence plea.