## Facts

- J. Paul and Patricia Preseault owned fee simple land in Burlington, Vermont, crossed by a historic railroad corridor acquired in the late 1800s.
- Rail service ceased by 1970, and by 1975 the tracks and equipment were removed; no federal abandonment certificate had been obtained.
- Congress authorized interim recreational trail use of unused rail corridors while preserving them for possible future rail service under the National Trails System Act Amendments (Trails Act), administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
- The ICC authorized discontinuance of rail service and interim conversion of the corridor across the property into a public trail for the City of Burlington.
- The landowners asserted the railroad held only an easement limited to “railroad purposes” that had been abandoned, causing the corridor to revert to them under Vermont law.
- After an earlier Supreme Court decision upheld the Trails Act against a facial takings challenge and directed landowners to seek compensation under the Tucker Act, the landowners sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for just compensation.
- The Court of Federal Claims ruled for the government; the Federal Circuit heard the appeal en banc.

## Issues

1. Under Vermont law, did the railroad hold a fee simple interest or an easement in the right-of-way?
2. If an easement, was its scope limited to “railroad purposes,” and did public recreational trail use fall within that scope?
3. Had the railroad easement terminated by abandonment before the trail authorization, causing reversion to the landowners?
4. Did the Trails Act conversion effect a compensable taking by imposing a new easement or by preventing reversion of state-law property interests?

## Decision

- The Federal Circuit (en banc) reversed in substantial part and held the United States liable for a taking requiring just compensation.
- The court concluded the railroad’s interest was an easement, not fee simple, under Vermont law governing railroad rights-of-way.
- The easement was limited to railroad purposes; a public recreational trail was outside that scope, so trail conversion constituted taking of a new easement for a new purpose.
- The court found the easement had been abandoned before the trail authorization based on cessation of service and removal of tracks and equipment, conduct inconsistent with continued easement use.
- Because trail use either imposed a new encumbrance or operated after the prior easement had ended, the conversion resulted in a physical taking of the landowners’ property rights.

## Legal Principles

- State property law defines the nature and scope of the property interest allegedly taken, including whether a railroad corridor is held in easement or fee and the permitted purposes of use.
- Railroad right-of-way interests commonly are construed as easements limited to railroad purposes unless a clearly contrary intent is shown under governing state law.
- An easement is not terminated by nonuse alone, but may be abandoned by objective conduct showing intent to relinquish or actions inconsistent with future existence of the easement.
- Government action that authorizes public use of private land outside the scope of an existing easement, or after an easement has terminated, effects a physical taking requiring just compensation.
- When a statute is valid on its face but its application burdens state-defined property interests, the proper remedy for a taking is compensation under the Tucker Act rather than invalidation of the program.

## Conclusion

The en banc Federal Circuit held that converting a railroad corridor to interim recreational trail use, where state law limited the railroad’s interest to a railroad-purpose easement that had been abandoned or did not cover trail use, imposed a new physical encumbrance on the landowners’ property and required just compensation from the United States under the Tucker Act.


Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc)