Facts
- Mr. Preston, a taxpayer, requested a concession regarding tax payments from the Inland Revenue.
- The Inland Revenue, possessing statutory authority to grant concessions, refused Mr. Preston's request.
- Mr. Preston sought judicial review, claiming the refusal was unreasonable and procedurally unfair.
- The central issue was the extent to which courts could scrutinize decisions by public bodies exercising discretionary powers.
Issues
- Whether the Inland Revenue’s refusal to grant a tax concession to Mr. Preston was amenable to judicial review.
- Whether courts could review discretionary decisions by public bodies for unreasonableness or procedural unfairness.
- Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation applied to Mr. Preston’s circumstances.
Decision
- The House of Lords dismissed Mr. Preston's appeal.
- The court affirmed the Inland Revenue’s authority to grant concessions was subject to judicial review but not to the extent of substituting judicial discretion for that of the Revenue.
- Judicial intervention was confined to ensuring the Revenue acted within statutory authority, considered relevant factors, and disregarded irrelevant ones.
- The court recognized that if a legitimate expectation arose from consistent past practice, deviation would require justification, though this was not determinative in Mr. Preston's case.
Legal Principles
- Discretionary powers of public bodies, including tax authorities, are subject to judicial review for illegality, unreasonableness, or procedural impropriety.
- Courts should not supplant the judgment of public bodies acting within their lawful discretion.
- The principle of legitimate expectation may apply where a public authority departs from established practice, requiring it to provide reasons for its decision.
- The Wednesbury unreasonableness standard informs judicial restraint when reviewing discretionary administrative decisions.
Conclusion
Preston v Inland Revenue Commissioners confirmed that discretionary decisions of public authorities are reviewable by courts only for illegality, unreasonableness, or procedural unfairness. The case reinforced the boundaries of judicial oversight without displacing the authority's discretion and contributed to the development of legitimate expectation in public law.