## Facts

- Diane Pretty, a U.K. national with advanced motor neurone disease, was mentally competent but physically unable to end her life without assistance.
- Under the Suicide Act 1961, suicide was not criminal, but assisting another’s suicide was a criminal offense.
- Pretty sought an undertaking from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) that her husband would not be prosecuted if he assisted her suicide.
- The DPP refused to give such an undertaking.
- Pretty unsuccessfully challenged the refusal and the statutory scheme in domestic courts, including the House of Lords.
- She then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that the refusal and the prohibition on assisted suicide violated Convention rights.

## Issues

1. Whether the right to life includes a right to die or to obtain assistance in ending one’s life (Article 2).
2. Whether denying access to assisted suicide in the face of terminal illness and suffering constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment attributable to the State (Article 3).
3. Whether criminalizing assisted suicide, as applied to a person unable to act unaided, unjustifiably interferes with private life and personal autonomy (Article 8).
4. Whether moral or conscientious convictions about ending one’s life are protected so as to require an exception to the criminal prohibition (Article 9).
5. Whether the scheme unlawfully discriminates against physically disabled persons who cannot commit suicide without assistance (Article 14, in conjunction with other Articles).

## Decision

- The court unanimously found no violation of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9, or 14.
- Article 2 was not interpreted to include a right to die or a right to obtain assistance in dying.
- Article 3 did not impose a duty on the State to permit or facilitate assisted suicide, and the complained-of suffering was not treatment inflicted by the State.
- Article 8 was engaged, but the interference was justified as lawful and necessary to protect life and the rights of others, particularly vulnerable persons.
- Article 9 did not provide a basis for exemption from the general criminal law beyond the analysis under Article 8.
- Article 14 was not violated because the prohibition on assisting suicide applied generally and the differential impact did not amount to unlawful discrimination.

## Legal Principles

- The right to life cannot be read as conferring a negative right to death or an entitlement to assistance in dying.
- Article 3’s absolute prohibition does not create a positive obligation to authorize assisted suicide; State responsibility requires treatment attributable to the State meeting a high severity threshold.
- Personal autonomy and bodily integrity may fall within private life under Article 8, but restrictions may be justified to protect life and prevent abuse, including safeguarding vulnerable persons from pressure.
- States have a margin of appreciation in regulating ethically contested end-of-life matters through criminal law.
- Article 9 protects beliefs but does not generally require exemptions from neutral criminal laws in this context.
- A generally applicable prohibition on assisting suicide does not, without more, constitute discrimination under Article 14 merely because it affects those unable to act without assistance.

## Conclusion

The court held that the Convention did not require the United Kingdom to exempt assisted suicide from criminal liability or to provide prosecutorial immunity for a spouse, and it upheld the state’s authority to prohibit assistance in suicide to protect life and vulnerable persons.


Pretty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2346/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002)